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PRELUDE
The delivery of health care services is an intensely personal
activity. Patients necessarily place their physical well-being in
the hands of other persons, either physicians or other providers.
Because health care technology and the science of medicine'
have progressed so swiftly over the past hundred years, the
focus and direction of the relationships among the parties
involved in the delivery of health care have changed dramati-
cally. As technology and science developed, the cost of transfer-
ring skills and services from the provider to the patient grew
geometrically. In the days when the physician-patient relation-
ship was considered more art than science, delivery consisted of
a one-to-one transfer of skills. The physician looked at the
patient, listened to a description of the patient's symptoms, con-
ducted a few very simple tests, prescribed drugs or conduct that
the physician believed might help, and promised to return later
to see if, in fact, she had helped. Today, as medicine moves
more toward science and technology, the physician is likely to
use looking and listening only as a starting point. She then
refers the patient for sophisticated machine testing of many
varieties and for more looking and listening by other providers
having narrow specialties. The end result is a final diagnosis
that takes into account the expertise of perhaps dozens of
people.
As these changes have made the practice of medicine more
and more complex, the cost of health care delivery has increased
and has become a national concern. At some point, the cost
becomes greater than the benefit. We are now involved in a
search for a new means of determining when, to whom, and how
much of such services we, as a nation, should provide. This
1. As opposed to the art.
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search has been characterized as the need for cost containment.
It is being carried out in many ways and in many areas of the
health care industry. One view of acceptable limitations on the
delivery of health care is called "managed care." But managed
care, like other programs in the past, has become so focused on
the problem of cost that it may very well be losing sight of what
should be the overriding purpose of health care-the well-being
of the patient. After all, the patient is the raison d'6tre for the
entire system. The patient's well-being is not directly aided by
cost containment, but the patient's well-being is the focus of
other important health care issues, such as quality of care and
access to care. The manner in which cost containment, quality
of care, and access to care interact and the priorities given to
them will determine the future structure of our nation's health
care system.
We now seem to be entering into a new phase of health care
delivery. A hundred years ago, the physician-patient relation-
ship was the core of the health care system. That relationship
remained central to any health care delivery changes taking
place until around 1970. Even with the introduction of third-
party payers in the form of insurance plans, the physician-
patient relationship remained unaffected. The physician deter-
mined what services would be delivered to the patient; the
patient received the services, having paid premiums (or having
premiums paid for his benefit) to the third-party payer; the
third-party payer either reimbursed the patient or paid the phy-
sician directly. The third-party payer simply had no right to
affect the physician-patient relationship and, in fact, did not
affect that relationship.
After 1970, however, a new triangle of relationships came
into being. In this triangle, the third-party payer not only con-
tracts with the patient to finance the patient's health care
needs, it also contracts with physicians and other providers to
provide those health care needs. Two problems arise from this
second contractual relationship. First, through "utilization
review," the third-party payer assumes the right to direct the
means and methods of providing the health care services. Sec-
ond, through its contracts with providers, the third-party payer
induces compliance with utilization review by means of finan-
cial rewards and penalties, or financial "risk shifting."
These two new aspects of health care relationships, utiliza-
tion review and financial risk shifting, create the possibility
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that patients may be injured in totally new ways. Before the
new relationships were created, the only way a patient could be
medically injured was through the physician's conduct. With
the advent of the new relationships, patients may be indirectly
medically injured because decisions may be made based on
some statistical norm, not on the patient's individual condition.
Further, the patient may be medically injured by conduct of the
physician, not because of the physician's own decision, but
because of a third-party payer's guidelines, with which the phy-
sician is trying to comply. For example, consider the cases of
Kim, Brad, and Barbara.
Kim needs an operation on her knee. Through her
employer, Kim has health insurance with a preferred provider
organization (PPO). One doctor, a member of the PPO, recom-
mends an operation. Another doctor recommends a procedure
that is more expensive but will require less healing time. Kim
cannot go to the second doctor, who is not a member of the PPO,
because she cannot afford to pay for the operation herself.
When she has the operation recommended by the PPO doctor,
she takes two months longer to heal than if she had the more
expensive operation.
Brad, a teenager, is suicidal. Through their employer,
Brad's parents have insurance for him. His doctor wants to
admit Brad to a psychiatric hospital. The insurance company,
however, requires preapproval of any nonemergency hospital
admission and denies approval. Because Brad's parents cannot
afford the twenty-one day proposed hospital stay, they decide to
have him treated as an outpatient. Five days later, Brad com-
mits suicide.
Barbara, a single mother, is pregnant. She works for mini-
mum wage, but qualifies for government health insurance.
Because the government health insurance pays doctors signifi-
cantly less than what they would receive from other patients,
there is no doctor in her immediate community who will accept
her health insurance. The nearest doctor is one hour and two
bus transfers away. Because of the three or four hours she
would have to miss from work, Barbara does not receive ade-
quate prenatal care. Her baby is born premature and has a low
birth weight.
These three hypotheticals illustrate situations in which
individuals may have adequate insurance but may not have
adequate health care. As illustrated by the above stories, pri-
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vate insurers and government health insurance programs
ration care by restricting choice, denying services, and decreas-
ing availability. They perform utilization review and financial
risk shifting through managed care products such as health
maintenance organizations and preferred provider organiza-
tions. Prior to the advent of the new triangle of relationships,
none of the problems illustrated above would have arisen in
exactly the same way they now arise.
I. INTRODUCTION
The escalation of health care costs has put the words "cost
control" 2 on everyone's lips and has forced society to reevaluate
the American health care system.3 Early reimbursement plans
rewarded physicians for providing expensive and sometimes
unnecessary treatment.4 Third-party payers and government
then developed alternative market-driven plans, which econom-
ically penalized physicians for providing what was perceived to
be unnecessary care.
In particular, third-party payers have depended on man-
aged care products, which revolutionize the relationship among
third-party payers, physicians, and patients.5 Under managed
care products, the risk of financial loss shifts from third-party
payers to physicians. The clear problem with this approach is
that physicians, concerned that they will be left to cover costs
2. Each player probably means something different by the term "cost control."
Patients mean price; third-party payers mean cost.
3. Between 1960 and 1983, per capita health care rose from 5% to nearly 11% of the
gross national product (GNP). E. Haavi Morreim, Cost Containment and the Standard
of Medical Care, 75 CAL. L. Rxv. 1719, 1720 (1987). In 1989, health costs consumed
11.6% of the GNP, up from 11.2% in 1988 and up by nearly a point in just three years.
HEALTH LAW. NEWS REP., Feb. 1991, at 3; see also Clifford Ossario, Increasing Costs Are
Pressuring the Entire Health Care Industry, 9 WHITIER L. REv. 197, 197 (1987). In
1989, total health care expenditures were $604 billion, up by $60 billion or 11% from
1988. HEALTH LAw. NEws REP., supra, at 3. For most employers, health care
expenditures are approaching 10% of payroll costs. Ossario, supra, at 197. In fact, the
total worth of the Fortune 500 today is less than the commitment of those companies to
health care expenditures for their retirees. Id. at 197-98.
These escalating costs have been attributed to several factors including price
inflation, the graying of America, new technologies, and the growth in the number of
hospitals. Morreim, supra, at 1720; William B. Schwartz, The Inevitable Failure of
Current Cost-Containment Strategies, 257 JAMA 220 (1987).
4. There are many health care providers (e.g., nurses and chiropractors) to whom
this same analysis applies. For the sake of simplicity, this Article refers only to
physicians. Similarly, although there are many types of organizations that provide
health care (e.g., hospices and nursing homes), this Article refers only to hospitals.
5. See infra part II.C.
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for which the third-party payer refuses reimbursement, will cut
necessary services and will leave patients almost completely out
of the decision-making process. 6
Without proper controls, the zeal of third-party payers to
lower costs encourages physicians not only to eliminate unnec-
essary care, but to eliminate beneficial care as well. Further-
more, risk shifting has the potential to worsen problems of
access to health care service.7 The actual impact of managed
care products on physician behavior is unknown, and the uncer-
tainty makes the product dangerous to the patient. Because the
patient is left with significantly less control over health care
decisions than was previously available, the danger is
unreasonable.8
Third-party payers use techniques for risk shifting that are
designed to encourage physicians to push their practices to the
outer limits of acceptable medical standards.' Because quality
measurement'0 is difficult at best, such actions may make it
hard to decide where acceptable medical practice ends and mal-
practice begins. Moreover, if managed care products are
allowed to determine the standard of care, how can injured
patients support claims against those products for physician
negligence? In other words, will cost containment efforts
imposed by third-party payers constitute a defense to medical
malpractice claims?
While the goal of financial risk shifting is to reduce unnec-
essary care and so-called "marginally helpful care," without
appropriate safeguards the potential exists for withholding nec-
essary and potentially helpful care. If a person is injured
because the physician failed to provide marginally helpful care,
what legal standard of care applies? Will the standard of care
be based on whether the unprovided service was "medically nec-
essary"? Will the definition of "medically necessary" be based
on the statistical person or on the individual patient?
6. See infra part III.C.
7. See infra part III.C.3.
8. While it is true that patients have never had complete control over health care
decisions because of their lack of knowledge of the medical system and treatments
available, patients exercise control when there are competing therapies with different
risks and different outcomes, or when the cost of the preferred treatment exceeds a
patient's financial capabilities. Managed care products would remove from the menu of
options available to patients those therapies and treatments that the managed care
products view as unnecessary.
9. See infra part Ill.B.
10. See infra part III.C.1.
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The courts have not yet allowed financially interested prov-
iders to redefine the medical standard of care. There is some
risk, however, that such a self-serving redefinition may indeed
occur and result in uncompensated injury to patients. It is this
potential risk of uncompensated injury from which patients
must be protected. Traditionally, the law affords significant
respect for the physician-patient relationship, a relationship
that must be based on trust. If society chooses to allow third-
party payers to tamper with the physician-patient relationship,
society must force those third-party payers to take responsibil-
ity for the injuries that occur."
It will serve this society little if lower health care costs are
achieved by means of uncompensated injuries to individuals. It
will serve this society little if-in the interest of reducing gov-
ernment taxes or increasing profits or market share for third-
party payers-society adopts a system in which the rule is
"caveat patients." It will serve this society little if a market-
based system aggravates inherent class differences.
Managed care products are potentially dangerous to indi-
vidual patients and to society. The entities that can minimize
that danger are the third-party payers who design, plan, and
benefit from managed care products. Yet, because of the pecu-
liar nature of the relationships among patient, physician, and
third-party payer, current legal theories are inadequate to pro-
mote safety, to shift the risk, and to spread the burden.12 Tort
theories put an extraordinary burden on the plaintiff in areas
where the defendant has the more complete knowledge, often
the only knowledge. Tort theories are also inadequate because
of the effect of utilization review and financial risk shifting,
which recasts injury-producing decisions that would previously
have been analyzed in terms of negligence as nonnegligent
judgmental conduct.' 3
The tort system produces a significant element of chance,
heavy transactional costs, inadequate compensation recovery,
enormous malpractice premiums, and ineffectual deterrents.
Furthermore, even if tort theories could provide an adequate
remedy, the Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974
11. This Article does not address tort liability for interference with the physician-
patient relationship. This Article assumes that there has been no tortious interference
but that there has nevertheless been injury.
12. See infra part IV. This Article is limited to a discussion of tort theories of
liability. It does not discuss contract theories of liability.
13. See infra part IV.
[Vol. 17:1
Compensating for Health Care Injuries
(ERISA)14 restricts or denies coverage for injuries based on util-
ization review activities and financial risk shifting.' 5 Given
society's desire to control health care costs through cost contain-
ment activities, alternate mechanisms should be developed to
compensate the victims who are injured by such activities. A
medical injury compensation fund could provide appropriate
compensation, not only to the victims of cost containment activi-
ties, but also to others receiving medical injuries.
This Article examines current tort remedies for personal
injury claims and explores the problems that arise when these
remedies are applied to physicians' actions that are directed by
third-party payers. Part II of this Article explores the organiza-
tion and historical development of managed health care prod-
ucts. Part III considers the past and present uses of the
utilization review process and financial risk shifting. Part IV
explores the applicability of traditional theories of tort liability
to third-party payers, including direct liability of third-party
payers who market managed care products. Part V considers
the barriers that ERISA presents to compensating patients for
cost containment injuries. Part VI proposes a no-fault medical
injury compensation scheme as a legislative remedy for cost
containment and other medical injuries.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to
repeat it.
George Santayana 16
Over the last one hundred years, America's health care sys-
tem has undergone several major changes. It has moved from a
home-based system to a hospital-based system. It has moved
from a nursing care-based system to a technology-based system.
It has moved from a patient-driven system to a provider-driven
system. Each change introduced not only advances in health
care, but also perverse negative aspects. Perhaps, the negative
features that were introduced into the system might have been
avoided if more attention had been paid to the down side of
changes occurring in the health care system. The health care
14. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
15. See infra part V.
16. Paul R. Torrens, Historical Evolution and Overview of Health Services in the
United States, in INTRODUCTION To HEALTH SERVICES 3, 3 (Stephen J. Williams & Paul
R. Torrens eds., 1980).
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system is again undergoing major changes as it moves from a
provider-driven system to a third-party payer-driven system.
As the new system is being designed and implemented, it is
important to understand how the current systemic problems
developed. Only then can actions be taken to avoid analogous
pitfalls in this new third-party payer-driven system. Section A
of this Part provides an overview of the historical development
of third-party payers. Section B discusses the impact third-
party payers have had on health care delivery. Finally, Section
C considers the development of managed care products as a
response to cost containment issues. Together these sections
are designed to help us remember the past so that we will not be
condemned to repeat it.
A. Overview of Historical Development
1. From Home to Hospital
From the 1700s to the mid-1800s, those who became sick or
injured and could pay stayed at home for treatment.17 Only the
lowest class person went to the hospital, which was often only a
separate wing on the almshouse, jail, or pesthouse.' 8 In the late
1700s, at the urging of European-trained physicians, a few com-
munities established the first community-owned or voluntary
hospitals."9 Although these hospitals admitted both the poor
and paying patients,2 0 it was not until the late 1800s that hospi-
17. See William L. Dowling & Patricia A. Armstrong, The Hospital, in
INTRODUCTION TO HEALTH SERVICES 125, 127 (Stephen J. Williams & Paul R. Torrens
eds., 1980).
18. Moderate-sized cities had almshouses, which were also called poorhouses.
These institutions primarily provided food and shelter for the homeless. Medical care
was generally only a secondary function. Pesthouses operated as quarantine stations
for persons with contagious illness. Usually, mentally ill persons received care at home,
at the almshouse, or at the jail. See, e.g., id. at 126-28.
19. Among the first voluntary hospitals were Pennsylvania Hospital, opened in
Philadelphia in 1751; New York Hospital, New York City in 1773; Massachusetts
General Hospital in 1816. Id. at 128. During the same time, governmental agencies
established city, county, and state mental health hospitals, including ones at
Williamsburg, Virginia in 1773; Lexington, Kentucky in 1817; and at Columbia, South
Carolina in 1829. Id.
20. Id. at 127-28. Voluntary hospitals were run as private charities. They were
generally crowded and dirty. Most of the persons using them had contagious diseases,
and nurses were usually former patients. Unpaid physicians worked out of a mixed
sense of charity and the opportunity to practice their cures. Doctors charged medical
students for medical training, and the students worked without pay, practicing and
learning on the poor. Steven R. Owens, Pamperin v. Trinity Memorial Hospital and The
Evolution of Hospital Liability: Wisconsin Adopts Apparent Agency, 1990 Wis. L. REV.
1129, 1131-32.
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tal stays became widely accepted. As late as 1873, there were
only 178 hospitals with a total of 35,064 beds in the entire
United States.2 Only thirty-six years later, in 1909, the
number had grown to 4,359 hospitals with 421,065 beds, and by
1929 to 6,665 hospitals with 907,133 beds.22
2. The Coming of the Blues
The Great Depression caused a dramatic change in the eco-
nomic state of hospitals as patients unable to pay for health
care simply stayed away. As early as 1930, average hospital
receipts fell from $236.12 per patient in the 1920s to $59.26, bed
occupancy dropped from 71.28% to 64.12%, and hospital deficits
rose dramatically.23 Hard hit by the depression, the American
Hospital Association (AHA) developed the Blue Cross concept to
assure stable revenues.2 4
The Blue Cross plans simply guaranteed payment of hospi-
tal costs, albeit in an environment of limited technology and
patient self-rationing. Given the general economic state, the
popularity of the plans was predictable. The plans, however,
covered only hospital costs. Physicians, through the American
Medical Association (AMA), sought to keep coverage limited.
The AMA took the position that medical ethics permitted only
insurance that was paid directly to patients. 25 The AMA feared
that if third-party payers became intermediaries, they would
eventually play a significant role in determining medical treat-
ment.26 Specifically, the AMA feared that third-party payers
who paid physicians directly would eventually require the phy-
sicians to make medical decisions based on the third-party pay-
ers' interest rather than on the patients' interest. 27
Nevertheless, under increasing political pressure, some state
21. Dowling & Armstrong, supra note 17, at 128.
22. Id.
23. See SYLvIA A. LAw, BLUE CROSS: WHAT WENT WRONG? 6 (1974); see also
Dowling & Armstrong, supra note 17, at 131.
24. The hospital industry developed the model state legislation necessary to create
local nonprofit, tax-exempt corporations for prepayment of hospital services. See Lw,
supra note 23, at 6-9; Dowling & Armstrong, supra note 17, at 131.
25. See PAUL STARR, THE SocIL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE, 215-16
(1982) (describing organized medicine's resistance to health insurance because of the
potential for insurers to place themselves between patients and physicians).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 216-17.
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medical societies approved medical service benefit plans called
Blue Shield.2"
Like Blue Cross, Blue Shield proved extremely popular.
Over the last sixty years, the Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans
have become the largest providers of private medical insur-
ance."9 The current interest in managed care plans, which
emphasize controlling physicians' behavior, indicates that phy-
sicians' historical fears of third-party payer control of medical
practice decision making were well founded.3 °
3. World War II and Beyond
With the coming of commercial insurance after World War
II, the health insurance industry experienced significant
growth. As medical technology advanced, reliable access to
medical services became increasingly important. This led
employers to begin to use health care benefits as a part of
employee compensation. This, in turn, led to an increasing
demand for health insurance as a standard benefit of employ-
ment,3 ' which brought commercial insurance companies into
competition with the Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans.32
Unlike early Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans, commercial
policies offered an indemnity benefit.33 To compete, Blue Cross
and Blue Shield adopted similar provisions and abandoned,
28. Id. at 306-09.
29. In 1980, the Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans provided surgical coverage to 74
million individuals while all other companies insured about 101 million. In 1984,
commercial insurers collected $43.6 billion in premiums and paid $33.3 billion in
claims. During the same period, the Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans had $39.9 billion
in subscription income and paid $35.7 billion in claims. Therefore, the commercial
insurers paid 76.3 cents in claims of each dollar they collected in premiums. The Blue
Cross and Blue Shield plans paid 90 cents of each dollar. Sylvia A. Law & Barry
Ensminger, Negotiating Physicians'Fees: Individual Patients or Society? (A Case Study
in Federalism), 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 7-8 n.31 (1986).
30. See Minutes of the Eighty-Fifth Annual Session of the American Medical
Association, 102 JAMA 2191, 2201 (1934) (recommending that there be "no restrictions
on treatment or prescribing not formulated and enforced by the organized medical
profession').
31. See J. LuNny, HEALTH INSURANCE: THE PRO-COMPETITION PROPoSALS 4
(Congressional Research Service Report No. 81046, 1984). As part of employees' fringe
benefits, most labor contracts now routinely include health care insurance. William B.
Schwartz & Henry J. Aaron, Hospital Cost Control: A Bitter Pill to Swallow, HARv. Bus.
REv., Mar-Apr. 1985, at 160-61 (describing development of health care "payment system
expressly designed to shield patients and providers from the cost of hospital care").
32. STARR, supra note 25, at 313-15.
33. An indemnity benefit pays patients directly. The insurance company sets
premiums based on risk experience, allowing it to charge lower premiums to groups of
reasonably healthy people.
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among other things, service benefit and community rating.s4
Because of the higher cost of insurance that is individually
rated, the Blue Cross and Blue Shield abandonment of commu-
nity rating and adoption of an individualized rating system left
many people who could not afford the premiums unprotected.3 5
Thus, an increasing health care access gap began to develop
between those who had either health insurance or wealth, and
consequently could afford the cost of health care services, and
those who did not.
4. Medicare and Medicaid
In 1965, Congress responded to the medical insurance cri-
sis by creating Medicare 36 and Medicaid 37 programs. To
counteract initial opposition by the AMA and to assure physi-
cian participation, Congress gave Blue Shield the administra-
tive responsibility for reimbursement of physicians. Medicare
was to reimburse physicians on the basis of "customary, prevail-
ing, and reasonable charges." 3' For Medicaid, state govern-
ments determined how physicians were to be paid.3 9 Today,
about one-half of the states pay physicians based on fee sched-
34. Blue Cross plans negotiated payment rates with participating hospitals. To the
subscriber, the plans charged a single community-wide premium rating (community
rating). The hospitals were guaranteed payments for the provision of selected services
to the subscribers (service benefit).
35. STARR, supra note 25, at 331-34.
36. Congress established Medicare to provide medical care to the elderly. The
patient's ability to pay was irrelevant. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No.
89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); see S. REP.
No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st. Sess. 4 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943, 1945-46.
37. Medicaid, a cooperative state-federal program, provides health insurance to
income-eligible individuals and families. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1988).
38. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13951(a) (1988). Reasonable charges are the
lesser of the actual billed charge, the individual physician's customary charge, or the
prevailing charge in the community. 42 C.F.R. § 405.502(a) (1993).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 1302 (1988). The states' Medicaid payment levels to physicians
may not exceed Medicare's reasonable charges. See Johnson's Professional Nursing
Home v. Weinberger, 490 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1974) (upholding limitation of Medicaid
payments to Medicare standard of reasonable costs). Regulations require physician
reimbursement to be "sufficient to enlist enough providers so that services under the
plan are available to recipients at least to the extent that those services are available to
the general population." 42 C.F.R. § 447.204 (1993).
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ules.40  The remainder provide some form of charge-based
reimbursement. 4
Since 1965, Medicare and Medicaid have grown signifi-
cantly. Medicare currently accounts for approximately thirty-
five percent of national health care expenditures and forty per-
cent of hospital revenues.' 2 Yet, Medicare's impact extends
well beyond the program itself. For example, other institutional
purchasers of health care, such as private insurers, typically fol-
low Medicare's lead in medical technology and payment
schedules.43
B. Impact of Third-Party Payers on Health Care
By 1986, seventy percent of payments to providers were
made by public or private insurance. 44 The insurers' reim-
bursement methods introduced into the health care system
complex, often irrational economic incentives. The traditional
reimbursement method of private insurers was the fee-for-ser-
vice model,45 while government insurance reimbursed on a cost
40. Law & Ensminger, supra note 29, at 13. Under a fee schedule, Medicaid sets
the fees that it will pay. Relevant to the range of physician fees, schedules can be set
high, by using the higher physician fees, or low, by using the lower physician fees.
States can adjust fees to account for the patient's diagnosis; the service provided; the
physician's training, experience, and specialty; and whether the care was given in a
hospital or an ambulatory setting. Id. at 12.
41. Id. at 13. Charge-based reimbursement bases the payment to the provider on
recent historical charges by the individual provider and her colleagues. Private
insurance calls this "usual, customary, and reasonable reimbursement (UCR)," and
Medicare calls it the "customary, prevailing, and reasonable charge method (CPR)." Id.
at 12. When insurance pays charge-based reimbursement, it pays the least of the
provider's actual billed charge, the median amount that she customarily charges for
that procedure, or some percent of customary community charges for the medical
specialty and geographic locality. Id.
42. See generally Medical Technology Assessment: Hearings on H.R. 5496 Before
the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 98th Cong., 2d Seas. 544 (1984) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 5496]
(statement of Raymond Dross, M.D., on behalf of Health Insurance Association of
America); OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY
AND COSTS OF THE MEDICARE PROGRAM 45-61 (1984) [hereinafter CosTs OF THE
MEDICARE PROGRAM].
43. COSTS OF THE MEDICARE PROGRAM, supra note 42, at 23.
44. GEORGE J. ANNAs ET AL., AMERICAN HEALTH LAw 131 (1990).
45. The fee-for-service system, euphemistically called the "free lunch" system, has
delivered medical care without regard to cost containment and sometimes without
regard to medical necessity. Under the fee-for-service system, third-party payers pay
health care providers for each discrete item of service. In 1980, 50% of active physicians
were compensated by fee for service, approximately 20% were salaried, and the
remaining 30% received a mixed form of compensation. Sunny Yoder, Physician
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or charge basis.4" Both of these forms of reimbursement cre-
ated powerful incentives for all players in the health care sys-
tem to intervene excessively with overpriced procedures.47 No
one had an incentive to economize.
An individual who contracted with Blue Cross through an
employer for eighty percent of the usual, customary, and rea-
sonable cost (UCR) of medically necessary care lacked the
incentive to economize because no matter what the cost of
health care, the individual would be paying only twenty per-
cent.4" Because the insurance cost was shared with the
employer, the individual was not likely to scrutinize medical
expenditures to avoid future premium increases. Furthermore,
because insurers did not base health care insurance premiums
on "experience rating,"49 a patient's health care use would not
directly influence the cost of the insurance to the employer.
Thus, the patient was not likely to realize the full financial
impact of treatment decisions.
Nor were hospitals and physicians motivated to economize.
Because most insurers guaranteed providers eighty percent of
their customary charges, fee-for-service or cost-based charges
had an opposite and perverse influence on health service deliv-
ery.50 Providers earned more under both reimbursement sys-
tems when they treated more. This phenomenon had two
effects: First, physicians and hospitals tended to de-emphasize
preventive care, which was not as lucrative as treatment serv-
ices. Second, because insurers paid for discrete procedures, not
Payment Methods: Forms and Levels of Physicians Compensation, in REFORMING
PHYsIcIAN PAYMENT: REPORT OF A CONFERENCE 87, 88 (1984).
46. Under cost-based or charge-based reimbursement, third-party payers
reimburse providers for most of the costs or charges incurred in treating covered
patients.
47. Alexander M. Capron, Ethical Implications, Containing Health Care Costs:
Ethical and Legal Implications of Changes in the Methods of Paying Physicians, 36
CASE W. REs. L. REv. 708, 715 (1986).
48. When insurance induces a person to use more medical care than she would use
if she were paying for the services directly, then the insurance is a "moral hazard" with
respect to the person's indifference to cost. MARK A. HALL & IRA MARK ELLmAN,
HEALTH CARE LAw AND ETHics 8 (1990).
49. "Experience rating" means that the annual recalibration of premiums will
reflect each insured group's actual claims experience for the prior period. Mark A. Hall
& Gerald F. Anderson, Models of Rationing: Health Insurers' Assessment of Medical
Necessity, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1637, 1671 n.131 (1992). With experience rating, the
insurer has less incentive to refuse payment because all amounts it pays are recouped
in next year's premium increases.
50. See Capron, supra note 47, at 710-11 (stating that the payment system offers
incentives for excessive intervention with overpriced procedures).
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time spent with patients, providers tended to place excessive
reliance on the use of medical technology.
The insurers' methods of calculating fees to be paid further
complicated the picture. The practice of covering the UCR
allowed the provider to charge whatever the insurer would pay.
When the maximum payments available under usual and
customary became public knowledge, there was a natural ten-
dency on the part of physicians... to move to the maximum
available.... Once that was done, the whole concept of usual
and customary, based on physicians' pricing as an independ-
ent entity unaffected by their peers or others in the commu-
nity, was gone. The whole program changed its nature both
as to Medicare and as to private, usual and customary.
Prices rose dramatically.... [The doctor] could find [the max-
imum UCR] out very readily by simply testing the system by
raising his fees until he hit the upper limit, and they did.5 '
From the patient's point of view, insurance removed the
need to ration health care dollars, thus creating the moral haz-
ard problem.52 From the insurer's point of view, a payment sys-
tem that had worked well for auto and life insurance would
seem to make sense. Thus, health care indemnity plans were
designed and implemented on the basis of faulty assumptions
and expectations by all parties: the insurers' failure to recog-
nize the problem of moral hazard and the providers' and
patients' failure to recognize the need to continue to ration
health care.53
For over fifty years, the cost of health care was hidden from
most of the participants in the system. However, as the cost of
health care has spiraled upward, employers,54 government, 5
51. Kartell v. Blue Shield, 582 F. Supp. 734 (D. Mass. 1984) (testimony of John
Larkin Thompson, president of Massachusetts Blue Shield); Law & Ensminger, supra
note 29, at 14.
52. See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
53. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
54. Corporate employers face increasing difficulty when competing in the
international marketplace because of spiraling health care costs. Max W. Fine &
Jonathan H. Sunshine, Malpractice Reform Through Consumer Choice and Consumer
Education: Are New Concepts Marketable?, LAv & CoiNxieP. PROBS., Spring 19B6, at
213-14; Kenneth R. Wing, American Health Policy in the 1980's, 36 CASE W. REs. L.
REV. 608, 672-75 (1986).
55. The spiraling health care costs are pushing governmental programs to the
brink of disaster. For example, it is predicted that by the mid-1990s Medicare will face
bankruptcy. Board of Trustees Report, A Proposal for Financing Health Care of the
Elderly, 256 JAMA 3379, 3379 (1986). State Medicaid programs consume excessive
portions of limited state funds. Morreim, supra note 3, at 1720.
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and third-party payers have gained strong incentives to
restrain costs.5 6  Employers and third-party payers desire to
protect their profits, and the government wants to reduce the
deficit by decreasing health care expenditures. Because of their
profit interest, third-party payers are rigorously looking for
ways to control the untamed beast. During the early 1970s,
major employers began to self-insure to reduce costs,57 and the
government switched to using diagnosis-related groups as its
method of paying hospitals.58
These efforts have had limited effectiveness. While self-
insurance helped employers avoid the problem of increased pre-
miums, it did little to control the actual cost of health care.59
Similarly, Medicare and Medicaid's use of diagnosis-related
groups for prospective payment of hospital services has not
proved effective in controlling costs. 60 In a second-stage effort
to control health costs, third-party payers redesigned health
benefit plans to pass on increased costs to the employee by elim-
inating "first-dollar" coverage and significantly increasing
deductibles.6 1 It is predicted that by 1995, ninety-eight percent
of major employers will have eliminated first-dollar coverage.62
56. See Jon Gabel et al., The Emergence and Future of PPOs, 11 J. HEALTH POL.
PoL'Y & L. 305 (1986). In 1989, private insurance and other private payers paid 37% of
health care bills, government programs paid 42%, individuals paid 37% (premiums),
and business paid 30% of the bills. HEALTH LAW. NEWS REP., supra note 3, at 3. During
that year, 39% of the money went to hospitals, 19% to physicians, and 8% to nursing
homes. Id.
57. Harold L. Bischoff, Utilization Review and Health Maintenance Organizations
(HMOs) (1989) (unpublished fellowship thesis, American College of Healthcare
Executives, on file with the University of Puget Sound Law Review).
58. See Alexander M. Capron & Bradford H. Gray, Between You and Your Doctor,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 1984, § 1, at 24; see also infra note 60 and accompanying text.
59. But see Tim Healy, High Stakes-For the Self-Insured- Health Costs Push
Small Employers to Seek Alternatives, SEATTL= TuMEs, Feb. 4, 1991, at B1.
60. Medicare classifies each patient's hospital admission into one of 468 diagnostic
groups. Medicare then multiplies the average price and "weight" of the procedure to
predetermine the reimbursement the hospital will receive for the care given the patient.
Michael Tichon, Current Issues in Reimbursement: Medicare and Medicaid, 6 WHITTIER
L. REV. 851, 851 (1984). From that payment, the hospital keeps, as profit, moneys not
spent on patient care; alternatively, the hospital absorbs any loss. On the positive side,
diagnosis-related groups limit hospitalization and the use of costly technologies. See
Bruce C. Vladeck, Medicare Hospital Payment by Diagnosis-Related Groups, 100
ANNALs INTERNAL MED. 576 (1984). However, profit or loss potential creates an
incentive for hospitals to discharge patients earlier and perform fewer interventions.
Some providers have begun to stabilize the effect by "unbundling" care. See generally
Arnold M. Epstein & David Blumenthal, Physician Payment Reform: Past and Future,71 MiLBANK Q. 193 (1993).
61. Bischoff, supra note 57, at 3.
62. Id. at 4.
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Elimination of first-dollar coverage would appear to give the
patient economic incentives to control the use of health care
services. However, some individuals may respond to the incen-
tives by significantly underutilizing services, thus adversely
affecting their health.63
Current cost containment efforts shift the risk of financial
loss for health care in whole or in part to the providers of that
care.6" Physicians are offered economic incentives to act as the
third-party payer's agent-the gatekeeper to health care serv-
ices. 65 As gatekeepers, physicians are concerned with limiting
access to health care services so that third-party payers do not
find excessive utilization. If a third-party payer determines
that a physician has ordered too many services, the third-party
payer financially penalizes the physician.66 Consequently, phy-
sicians are motivated to order services for patients within third-
party payer guidelines. Thus, gatekeeping shifts the focus of
the health care system from the physician-patient relationship
to the relationship between the physician and third-party
payer. Ultimately, the physician and the third-party payer will
determine the quality of care received by the patient and the
patient's access to that care.
63. Eliminating first-dollar coverage has had limited effect on most patients. In
general, unless the deductible is very high, the patient merely incorporates into her
decision making only that portion of health costs that she is required to bear. Thus, if
the patient must bear the first $300, only that amount affects her overall health care
decision making. Such behavior is rational and predictable. Consider how our eating
habits would differ if we had to pay only one fifth of our food costs.
64. Despite the historical opposition by providers to risk shifting, the position of
physicians and hospitals has been weakened by the current economic situation. One
third of total hospital capacity is permanently idle, and patient days dropped from 280
million in 1980 to 240 million in 1984. By the mid-1990s, it is predicted that the
number will drop to 120 million. There are now 2.2 physicians per 1,000 persons, 1.2
physicians more than needed. By the year 2000, it is predicted that we will have 1.5
more physicians than needed. Galen D. Powers, Allocation of Risk in Managed Care
Programs, in MANAGED HEALTH CARE: LEGAL AND OPERATIONAL ISSUEs FACING
PROVIDERS, INsuRERs, AND EmPLOYRs, at 279 (PLI Commercial Law and Practice
Course Handbook Series No. 393, 1986), available in WEsTLAw, TP-All File.
65. Carolyn M. Clancy & Bruce E. Hillner, Physicians as Gatekeepers: The Impact
of Financial Incentives, 149 ARCHvES INTERNAL MED. 917, 917 (1989).
66. See infra part III.B.
67. The gatekeeping role is not new to physicians. They have used their position in
several ways. For instance, physicians have used their authority as health care
gatekeepers to resist hospitals' and insurers' efforts to influence medical treatment.
Furthermore, they have generally used their role to obtain more services for the patient,
not fewer. Now, however, they use their position to save money for third-party payers
by ordering fewer services. See STARR, supra note 25 at 26-27; Capron, supra note 47, at
747. Thus, the fundamental change in the basic ethical concern of the system is
revolutionary-from the "best interest of the patient" to "cost containment."
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As employers, government, and other third-party payers
more aggressively seek market share and profits, the health
care marketplace is driven by fierce competition for enrollees .6
At the same time, third-party payers demand experience rating
and utilization data on the services they are purchasing. 9
Third-party payers attempt to limit their costs by reducing the
amount a physician or hospital receives for the average
patient's care.70 Third-party payers have developed plans that
limit the amounts and types of services that can be used.71
They have sought to restrict physicians' decision-making power.
In short, third-party payers have entered the managed care
business, with management in the hands of the third-party
payer, not the physician or the patient.72
C. The Development of Managed Care Products
The third-party payer-driven system can look deceptively
like the provider-driven system. The traditional contractual
relationships between patient and third-party payer, and
between physician and patient, continue to exist. However, a
new relationship between the third-party payer and the physi-
cian now exists. Thus, in the payer-driven system, there is a
triangular relationship. The physician is legally and profes-
sionally obligated to act in the patient's best interest. The
third-party payer is contractually obligated to pay for services
rendered by the physician. The physician is contractually obli-
gated to provide services under the guidelines set by the third-
party payer if the physician wishes to be paid for the medical
services. Thus, the physician manages the patient's health care
for the third-party payer-leading to the term "managed care
68. Ossario, supra note 3, at 198; see Marc P. Freiman, Cost Sharing Lessons from
the Private Sector, H.ALTH Arr., Winter 1984, at 85, 86.
69. For instance, insurance carriers increasingly attempt to identify inappropriate
medical interventions. See, e.g., Capron, supra note 47, at 715.
70. Essentially, third-party payers reduce provider pay by refining current
payment methods, using explicit fee schedules, or bargaining for prices. Refining
current payment methods, because it involves only modifying the calculation of the fee
paid, provides the least radical change in third-party payer reimbursement. Explicit fee
schedules have been used for basic medical expenses, and use of the schedules for
provider pay would merely extend their current use. The third-party payer pays the
lesser of the actual fee or the scheduled amount for the service. Under an explicit fee
schedule, the provider is paid directly. Id. at 718.
71. Third-party payers attempt to limit their payment for medical services by
"bundling" services for reimbursement purposes. By using this payment method, third-
party payers attempt to avoid the present excessive incentives to overtreat. Id. at 722.
72. See Bischoff, supra note 57, at 4-5.
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products." The two basic forms of managed care products are
health maintenance organizations (HMOs) and preferred pro-
vider organizations (PPOs).
1. Health Maintenance Organizations
An HMO is an organized system of health care delivery for
both hospital and physician services in which care delivery and
financing functions are offered by one organization.7 3 HMOs
provide both services to an enrolled membership for a fixed and
prepaid fee. The traditional HMO structure completely shifts
the financial risk from the third-party payer to the provider.
This shift means that HMOs can obtain cost savings only by
controlling both utilization and expenses. They do so by encour-
aging fewer hospital admissions, more outpatient procedures,
and fewer referrals to specialists.74
In Oklahoma in 1929, the Farmer's Union started the Coop-
erative Health Association using the familiar "farmer's co-op"
pooled financing structure.75 Around the same time, in Los
Angeles, Drs. Ross and Loss started a prepaid group health
delivery plan with comprehensive services.76
The AMA slowed the development of managed care by
labeling the concept "socialized medicine" or "communism. " 7
"The medical profession was unremittingly hostile [to managed
73. DOUGLAS D. BRADM, HMO AND PPO OvERviEw: HISTORY, DEVELoPMENrr AND
DEFINITIONS (Florida Bar 1989). There are five models of HMOs. The staff HMO model
delivers services by a physician group that is employed by the HMO, with the hospital
usually owned by the IMO plan. The group HMO model delivers services through an
outside physician group under contract. Hospital services are usually contracted for as
well. While the primary care network HMO model has multiple contracts with
physicians, it is the primary care physician who controls all specialty referrals. The
Individual Practice Association (IPA) HMO model delivers services through
independent practices. These practices can be solo or group practices that have
organized to pool the financial risk. The open-ended HMO allows enrollees to select
services outside the BMO provider staff, network, or IPA, but coverage is at the
traditional indemnity rate and is typically less comprehensive and more expensive than
the HMO's standard package. Id. at 1.5-1.6. Methods of payment to a provider are
based on the model used. Staff models use salary-based payment almost exclusively;
IPA models use both capitation and fee for service; network models use capitation;
group models are split among all three. See id.
74. Id. at 1.2.
75. Id. at 1.1. But see Sarah Glazer, The Failure to Contain Medical Costs, 2
EDITORIAL REs. REP. 510, 511 (1988) (giving Dr. Michael A. Shadid the credit for
establishing the first prepaid group practice in 1927, also in Oklahoma).
76. BRADHAM, supra note 73, at 1.1. The Ross-Loss Health Plan is the oldest HMO
still in existence. Milton H. Lane, Legal Relationships and Responsibilities in HMOs,
HEALTH CARE MGmrr. Rnv., Fall 1983, at 53.
77. BRADHAM, supra note 73, at 1.1.
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care], and by the end of the [1930s] succeeded in convincing
most states to pass restrictive laws that effectively barred
[managed care] plans from operating."7" Because of this opposi-
tion, HMOs developed haphazardly in response to the needs of
specific communities.7 9 In the early 1970s, when skyrocketing
health care costs were front page news, the AMA position weak-
ened. Conservatives were certain that market competition in
the health care system would reduce costs.
In 1973, in response to increasing pressure, Congress
passed legislation that required businesses with more than
twenty-five employees to offer their employees at least one fed-
erally qualified HMO as an alternative to conventional insur-
ance.8 0 With federal grant and loan money in hand, the HMO
industry experienced a steady growth between 1974 and 1983.1
Though the government discontinued federal loans, HMOs
experienced another growth spurt between 1983 and 1988,2
probably caused by the expansion of health maintenance cover-
78. Glazer, supra note 75, at 511 (quoting STARR, supra note 25, at 302).
79. For instance, in the 1930s, in response to a shortage of medical facilities for
construction workers, Kaiser Health Foundation Plan originated an HMO in connection
with the construction of an aqueduct near Los Angeles, California. The HMO started as
a series of capitation agreements with area physician groups under which the group
was paid $1.50 per month for each covered employee. As of March 1988, it was the
largest prepaid plan in the United States with 4,904,768 members in five states. Jack
F. Monahan & Michael Willis, Special Legal Status for HMOs: Cost Containment
Catalyst or Marketplace Impediment?, 18 STETSON L. REv. 353, 359 n.21 (1989).
80. Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e-300aaa
(1988). An HMO is defined under the legislation as an organization that provides
health services to members in specific geographic areas in return for periodic, fixed
prepayment. Id. § 300e. The prepayment is fixed without regard to frequency, kind, or
duration of service. Id. § 300e(bX1). An HMO must (1) assume full financial risk on a
prospective basis for the services provided to its members; (2) maintain a "fiscally sound
operation"; (3) protect its members from liabilities of the organization; and (4) provide
commercial members a comprehensive package of health services, which was
specifically prescribed in the legislation. Id. § 300e. Until the HMO Amendments of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-S17, 102 Stat. 2578 (1988), IMOs were required to use
community rate premiums for commercial members. Since 1988, however, HMOs are
permitted to develop premiums on the basis of their revenue requirements for providing
services to individuals and families of a group. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e-300q (1988); 42 C.F.R.
§ 417.104 (1992). Finally, the IMO Amendments of 1988 require employers to make an
equal contribution to HMO and other health benefit options and forbid employers to
financially discriminate against employees who enroll in an HMO. 42 U.S.C. § 300e-9
(1988). Nothing, however, prevents an employer from financially discriminating
against an employee who does not enroll in a managed care product.
81. Monahan & Willis, supra note 79, at 359.
82. The number of HMOs rose from 290 to 648 between 1983 and 1988, and
enrollment expanded from 13.7 million to 31 million members, averaging a 25%
increase per annum. Id. at 360 n.27.
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age to Medicaid and Medicare eligibles.8 3 In 1982, former Pres-
ident Reagan signed a bill that expanded the definition of
contracting entities to include entities other than federally
qualified HMOs and authorized Medicare payment on either a
prospective, per capita basis or on a reasonable cost basis.8 4
Other roadblocks to the growth of HMOs were also removed
during that period. For instance, many states had laws that
forbade the corporate practice of medicine. Consequently, many
states had to enact enabling statutes because HMOs required
some kind of corporate practice.8 5
With Medicaid authorization and state legal clearance, the
number of HMOs increased dramatically-about 900% in fif-
teen years.8 6 While recent market consolidation has resulted in
an actual decrease in the number of operating HMOs, the over-
all enrollment continues to climb.8 7
2. Preferred Provider Organizations
As HMOs stabilized as a cost control mechanism, third-
party payers pushed to find more efficient cost control methods.
The push resulted in the proliferation of other managed care
arrangements, most notably PPOs. PPOs contract directly with
an employer through the employer's health benefits department
or indirectly through an insurance carrier to provide health
83. Barry R. Furrow, The Changing Role of the Law in Promoting Quality in Health
Care: From Sanctioning Outlaws to Managing Outcomes, 26 Hous. L. Rev. 147, 151
n.16 (1989).
84. Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-222, 87 Stat. 924
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300e (1988)). This Act delineates the requirements
an HMO must meet to become federally qualified according to organizational structure,
health care benefits, and the manner of conducting business. Though federal
qualification is not intended to represent that the HMO is financially viable,
qualification is necessary to receive federal subsidies under the Act. Compliance also
serves as a means to demonstrate publicly that the HMO has complied with a federally
uniform standard.
85. While the approach to legalizing HMO authority varied, some states required
insurance providers to have a license to market their services. E.g., TEX. INS. CODE
ANN. §§ 20A-03-20A.06 (West 1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 609.01(2) (West Supp. 1993).
Other states required licensing to solicit members and operate. E.g., Knox-Keene
Health Care Service Plan Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFET CODE §§ 437.02, .12 (West 1990).
All states have generally exempted HMOs from state restrictions regarding the
corporate practice of medicine. But see Williams v. Good Health Plans, Inc., 743 S.W.2d
373, 378 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (noting no liability for IPA because it could not practice
medicine in Texas).
86. Robert B. Friedland, Introduction and Background: Private Initiatives to
Contain Health Care Expenditures, in THE CHANGING HEALTH CARE MARKET 15 (Frank
B. McArdle ed., 1986).
87. Monahan & Willis, supra note 79, at 361.
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care services from a preselected group of providers. 8  The lim-
ited list of providers means that the overall expense to the
patient is lower than the expense of traditional insurance. Phy-
sicians entering into provider contracts with PPOs agree to
accept both utilization review controls and financial risk shift-
ing structures. Third-party payers give consumers economic
incentives to use the PPO physicians through reduced fees for
services.8 ° Generally, local market conditions determine the
organization of a PPO.90 Most PPOs consist of a provider panel
made up of preferred hospitals and physicians. The PPO
employs fee schedules and utilization reviews that create a
monetary incentive for consumers to choose the PPO provider,
while leaving consumers free to choose their own providers.9 ' A
common feature among PPOs is the ability to efficiently process
provider claims.9 2 PPOs, however, can be organized in almost
any form, and they are essentially unregulated.93
Despite the lack of definition, PPOs are classified according
to sponsorship categories.9 4 Another distinguishing feature is
88. See generally Cheralyn E. Schessler, Liability Implications of Utilization
Review As a Cost Containment Mechanism, 8 J. CoNTEmp. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 379
(1992).
89. Greg de Lissovoy et al., Preferred Provider Organizations: Today's Models and
Tomorrow's Prospects, 23 INQUiRY 7, 7-8 (1986). Monetary incentives to the patient
effectively obviate freedom of choice. If a patient is unable to pay the difference, she will
have no choice but to utilize the preferred provider. Approximately 20 states have
attempted to resolve this issue by passing laws that limit the reimbursement
differential between PPO and non-PPO utilization. It is unclear whether such
limitations protect freedom of choice, as the protection limits the effectiveness of
managed care products. Norman Payson, A Physician's Viewpoint on PPOs, 6 WHITTIER
L. REv. 699, 699-705 (1984).
90. Peter Boland, Myths and Misconceptions About Preferred Provider
Arrangements, in THE NEW HEALTH CARE MARKET 500, 501 (Peter Boland ed., 1988).
91. Nine states (California, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota,
Nebraska, Virginia, and Wisconsin) have laws that permit prepaid health plans that
limit choice of provider. Fifteen states have pending legislation. Congress is also
considering legislation that would override state laws inhibiting managed care health
plans. Capron, supra note 47, at 721 n.39.
92. De Lissovoy et al., supra note 89, at 7.
93. Of the 51 jurisdictions, only 20 states have a regulatory scheme for PPOs. E.g.,
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:2201-40:2205 (1992); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-4106 (1988); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 58-65-1 (1991). Some states have indirectly regulated managed care
products. For example, Indiana enacted a law that forbids an insurer from
unreasonably discriminating against providers not willing to meet the terms of the
agreement offered to them. IND. CODE § 27-8-11-3 (1992). California forbids exclusion
from membership based on the category of the license. CAL. INS. CODE § 10133.6 (West
1993).
94. A 1986 national survey of PPOs classified them as (1) hospital sponsored
(including corporate hospital chains and joint sponsorships by hospitals and
physicians); (2) physician sponsored (including physician groups); (3) commercial
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the amount of risk that the PPO shifts to the provider. For
example, in most full-risk PPOs, the PPO assumes the role of
insurer and takes on all risk of loss. The PPO charges the
employer a premium and covers all the services provided to the
enrollee, including services offered at nonparticipating hospi-
tals.9 5 On the other hand, limited-risk PPOs assume only a por-
tion of the financial burden and shift part of the risk of the
enrollee's care to the provider."
D. Summary
Managed care products allocate financial risk in several
ways, from the complete risk shifting of the health maintenance
organization (HMO) to the varied risk shifting of the preferred
provider organization (PPO). Nevertheless, both forms have
the same goal: to reduce costs and increase profits by altering
the practice behavior of providers. 7 Third-party payers reward
or penalize providers based on the services they deliver, without
regard to the quality of those services. Thus, there is a strong
incentive for providers to control, for the financial benefit of the
third-party payers, the care received by the covered patient.
Whether that control will be detrimental to the overall quality
of care remains to be seen. But, without a doubt, managed care
products will be detrimental to some patients.
In 1980, managed care products were begging for providers
to enter into agreements with them. Today, it is not uncommon
to see this situation completely reversed.98 At least sixty per-
cent of individuals with employer-sponsored health care plans
insurance sponsored; (4) Blue Cross/Blue Shield sponsored; (5) investor
(entrepreneurial) sponsored; and (6) sponsored by other entities, such as union trusts.
Cathy L. Burgess, Comment, Preferred Provider Organizations: Balancing Quality
Assurance and Utilization Review, 4 J. CON'EMP. H.ALTH L. & PoL'Y 275, 277 (1988).
95. Powers, supra note 64, at 290-91.
96. Id. at 290; see infra part III.B.
97. Initially, managed care products were perceived as a combination of providers
offering discounts from customary charges and retrospective utilization review
programs for medical procedures and ancillary testing. Richard A. Hinden & Douglas
L. Elden, Liability Issues for Managed Care Entities, 14 SEroN HALL LEGIS. J. 1, 2
(1990). Although a significant portion of the marketplace still views managed care as
discount medicine, today's managed care products have evolved into entirely different
entities where the organization actively sets the parameters of medical practice. Id. at
2-3.
98. Robert G. Stevens, Managed Care Plans and Participating Provider
Agreements 3 (1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of Puget
Sound Law Review).
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are enrolled in managed care products.9 9 Furthermore, all
types of individuals and entities are developing these prod-
ucts.' ° Acute-care hospitals develop them as a device to main-
tain or increase their market share.10 Physicians develop
them to retain some control over health care delivery. 1 2 Insur-
ers develop them to keep profits up and to protect market
share. 10 3 Employers also develop managed care products to
control costs. 104 Finally, entrepreneurs develop managed care
products because "it appears to be a business in which one can
make a profit."1 0 5 Perhaps the only group not developing man-
aged care products is the group most affected by the delivery of
health services-patients.
Efforts to control costs through limiting providers' expendi-
tures will be magnified in the future because health care is an
increasingly business-oriented activity. In the face of a third-
party payer-driven delivery system, there is a need for either
legal theories or a compensation system that particularly
reflects institutionalized profit-seeking behavior. Otherwise, a
third-party payer-driven system seems destined by its very
structure to proceed at the expense of the patient's best
interest.10 6
99. Id.
100. One author has commented with dismay on the number of "inexperienced
people" entering the "business" of managed care. Ossario, supra note 3, at 198.
101. Richard Blacker, Preferred Provider Organizations, 6 WHrThER L. REV. 691,
692 (1984).
102. Id. at 692-93. The fact that physicians control the managed care organization
does not change the underlying analysis regarding liability. The underlying purpose to
control cost remains and the physician's behavior will be essentially the same as other
owners.
103. Id. at 693.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. For example, on legal and operational issues facing providers, insurers, and
employers, one commentator noted that changing physician practice patterns is more
important than thwarting outliers. Joseph J. Martingale, Cost Containment
Mechanisms: The Tools of the Managed Health Care Revolution, in MANAGED HEALTH
CARE: LEGAL AND OPERATIONAL ISSUES FACING PROVIDERS, INSURERS, AND EMPLOYERS
(PLI Commercial Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 393, 1986), available
in WESTLAw, TP-AIl File. Outliers are services or patterns of practices that fall outside
established norms. In general, outliers are statistical observations that are so far away
from the rest of the sample that they should be disregarded in statistical calculations.
See THOMAS H. WONNACOTr & RONALD J. WONNACOTr, INTRODUCTORY STATISTICS 417
(1972).
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III. THIRD-PARTY COST CONTAINMENT MEASURES
As discussed, many entities and individuals are designing
and implementing managed care products. The identity of the
organizers of a particular managed care product may have
profound effects on the quality of care under the product and on
the techniques used to shift the risk to the physician, hospital,
or other provider. Yet, there is a common focus for all managed
care products: To succeed in reducing health care costs and
generating profits, the managed care product must consistently
maintain effective cost containment efforts.10 7 Cost contain-
ment effectiveness depends on implementing a strict utilization
review process enforced by appropriate risk-shifting tech-
niques.10 Section A of this Part defines utilization review and
outlines utilization review structure. Section B describes the
way managed care products employ strict enforcement of utili-
zation review, through financial risk shifting, to control cost.
Section C outlines the effects of cost containment measures on
health care, including problems of assuring quality of care in
the managed care product and maintaining the ethical basis of
health care. Together, these sections provide an overview of the
structure, operation, and effects of managed care products that
is necessary to appreciate the need for a compensation system
that encompasses managed care injuries.
107. One recent study of 222 employers noted that utilization review efforts can
reduce total medical expenditures an average of 8.3%. Bishoff, supra note 57, at 9
(citing Glenn Ruffenbach, Employers Can Cut Health-Care Costs With "Utilization
Review," Study Finds, WALL ST. J., May 19, 1988, at A38). In 1988, another study
concluded that nearly 10% of the 800,000 hospital Medicare admissions were not
"medically justified." Id. However, it may be that utilization review can provide only
temporary relief and not a cure for increased costs. Id. at 10. That position would seem
to be supported by employers' perceptions of the major obstacles to health care cost
management: 76%-physician and hospital charges; 70%--costs of sophisticated
medical technologies; 59%---an aging population; 4 9%---an inability to enforce medical
performance standards; 42%---a failure of managed care to achieve projected savings.
Only 37% and 30% respectively believed that utilization of outpatient care and
utilization of inpatient care were major obstacles to health care cost management. Id.
at 10. These perceptions would indicate that utilization review is a minor player in
health care cost containment. Despite what may be a limited effectiveness of utilization
review, the lack of a utilization management program or an inefficient system without
supporting data probably disqualifies an entity from being a managed care system.
Hinden & Elden, supra note 97, at 50-51.
108. Boland, supra note 90, at 503.
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A. Utilization Review
1. Utilization Review Defined
Utilization review (UR) is the process by which an organi-
zation determines if medical services are appropriate and nec-
essary. Managed care products perform UR by examining
providers' authorization and furnishing of services to detect
variations from the norm that may indicate unnecessary or
inappropriate care. 10 9 When the third-party payer detects vari-
ation, it either does not pay the provider's charges (retrospec-
tive UR" 0 ) or refuses to authorize the provision of the service
(concurrent UR"l x and prospective URII2 ).
Utilization review takes several forms:
(1) preadmission review for scheduled hospitalization, 1 13
(2) admission review for unscheduled hospitalization, 114
109. Pamela S. Bouey, Peer Review in the Managed Care Setting, in MANAGED
HATH CARE 1988: LEGAL AND OPERATIONAL IssuEs (PLI Commercial Law and
Practice Course Handbook Series No. 471, 1988), available in WEsTLAw, TP-AIl File.
110. Retrospective utilization management programs analyze data on hospital
admissions, patterns of treatment, and utilization of certain procedures. See Bischoff,
supra note 57, at 14-15 (providing examples of retrospective review).
111. Concurrent review (or length of stay certification) determines the medical
necessity of a continued hospital stay. Hinden & Elden, supra note 97, at 52. A
concurrent review is conducted by a nurse reviewing the patient's treatment plan. The
nurse conducts the review at the hospital using established medical criteria. If the
nurse judges the treatment plan to be appropriate, she approves the stay until the next
review cycle or the patient is discharged. If she does not approve the treatment plan,
the nurse refers the case to a physician advisor who either confirms the need for
continued treatment or suggests alternate treatment. Bischoff, supra note 57, at 14.
112. Under a prospective review system, most nonemergency hospital admissions
must receive prior approval and an initial approved length of stay is assigned. Hinden
& Elden, supra note 97, at 52.
113. Preadmission review is a form of prospective review. Preadmission review
determines the medical necessity of a scheduled inpatient admission, expensive
procedures, or outpatient procedures. The initial determination is made by a nurse
review coordinator using established criteria. A registered nurse usually conducts off-
site preadmission certification. If there is a scheduled admission prior to
hospitalization, the patient's physician completes a review form. She describes the
patient's medical condition and the treatment plan, and forwards the form to the nurse
review coordinator. The nurse notifies the physician, patient, and hospital of her
decision regarding the appropriateness of admission and length of stay. Bischoff, supra
note 57, at 13-14.
114. Admission review is a form of concurrent review. Admission review
determines the medical necessity of unscheduled inpatient admissions or other
admissions not covered by preadmission review. Most managed care products use
admission review. The primary exception is hospitals that are paid based on diagnosis
related groups.
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(3) second opinions for elective surgery,1 1 5
(4) concurrent review, 116
(5) gatekeeping by primary physician, 1 7 and
(6) retrospective claims review.'
Despite all the current interest, utilization review is not
new. In the 1970s, Congress established Professional Stan-
dards Review Organizations (PSROs)."19 These PSROs were
composed of physicians and were responsible for monitoring
Medicare quality of care and conducting utilization review of
Medicare services.' 20 Medicare's PSROs, however, had limited
effectiveness. In 1982, Congress reorganized the PSRO pro-
gram, replacing PSROs with utilization and quality control
Peer Review Organizations (PROs).12
2. Utilization Review Structure
Utilization review may be conducted by providers, third-
party payers, or independent agencies. The provider who con-
ducts utilization review has a legal or a moral obligation to pre-
vent overutilization, but a financial desire to fill the beds. 122
From the third-party payer's point of view, the physician often
appears to be the least concerned with cost effectiveness
because the physician is likely to authorize more services than
appear necessary to the third-party payer. On the other hand,
115. Except by commercial insurers, second-opinion surgery is used much less
often. In 1985, commercial insurers required second opinions in nearly twice as many
programs as any other sponsor. De Lissovoy et al., supra note 89, at 11.
116. See supra note 111.
117. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
118. Retrospective review disallows payments of claims for utilization. Because
retrospective review disallows payment after the service has been received, it is not as
effective as prospective or concurrent review. Consequently, the use of retrospective
claims review is declining. However, it is useful as a tool to research provider claims.
For example, it would be useful in determining whether the objective laboratory data
(e.g., biopsy) and subjective data (e.g., surgeon notes) are consistent with the length of
stay or the length of surgery. See Bischoff, supra note 57, at 15. Consequently,
retrospective review can be a very important tool in a managed care product such as an
HMO.
119. See ANNAS et al., supra note 44, at 193.
120. Id.
121. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320c to 1320t-12 (1988); ANNs et al., supra note 44, at 193.
122. Interestingly, some commentators believe that allowing the provider to do the
utilization review is letting the "foxes guard the hen house." Burgess, supra note 94, at
283-84. In reality, no review organization is independent. All review organizations are
directly or indirectly concerned about encouraging overutilization or underutilization.
Hospitals enter PPOs primarily to remedy a decline in patient volume, so they may not
be inclined to conduct stringent utilization review, which might further reduce patient
volume. De Lissovoy, supra note 89, at 9.
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with a strong incentive to cut costs, the third-party payer may
err on the side of denying needed services. 123  Not even
independent agencies are truly independent when third-party
payers are paying the bills for the agencies' services. The agen-
cies' incentive is to maintain their contractual relationships
with the third-party payers. Thus, with the possible exception
of the provider, all entities who conduct utilization reviews
focus on a desire to decrease the use of medical services, not on
a desire to increase the quality of care.' 24
It is empty and unrealistic to declare that the physician
must act and be accountable for the patient's best interest while
society allows, even encourages, the physician to act in the best
interest of third-party payers. If "a man cannot serve two mas-
"i25ters, neither can the physician. One need not be a clairvoy-
ant to know which master will dominate.
The transaction between physician and patient becomes a
commodity transaction. The physician becomes an independ-
ent entrepreneur or the hired agent of entrepreneurs and
investors who themselves have no connection with the tradi-
tions of medical ethics. The physician begins to practice the
ethics of the marketplace, to think of his relationship with
the patient, not as a covenant or trust, but as a business and
a contract relationship .... Medical knowledge becomes pro-
prietary; the doctor's private property to be sold to whom he
chooses at whatever price and conditions he chooses. 1 2
6
Yet, the utilization review process is not the real culprit.
Risk-shifting mechanisms cause the physician to change her
pattern of practice from overutilization to appropriate utiliza-
tion at best and underutilization at worst. Without financial
risk shifting, utilization review would be nothing more than a
guard dog without teeth.
123. But see Linda L. Koss, Quality Review and Utilization Management, in THE
NEw HEALTcARE MARKET 680, 684-85 (Peter Boland ed., 1988) (identifying potential
advantages for a PPO that contracts with a hospital for utilization review).
124. While it is possible to have effective utilization review and high quality health
care, without a focus on quality it is more likely that utilization review will work to the
detriment of quality care. See infra part IH.C.2.
125. Matthew 6:24.
126. Edmund D. Pellegrino, Rationing Health Care: The Ethics of Medical
Gatekeeping, 2 J. CoNTEwe. HEALTH L. & PoL'y 23, 32-33 (1986).
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B. Strict Enforcement Through Financial Risk Shifting
Third-party payers seek to manipulate provider behavior
by shifting the risk of financial loss from the third-party payers
to providers. Financial risk shifting can arise in a variety of
arrangements: ownership interest, joint venture, or a bonus
arrangement. 127 The risk shifting can also be in the form of
rewards, 1 28 penalties, 129 or both.'3 ' The degree of risk assumed
by the provider varies with the type of payment arrangement.
Traditional fee-for-service practices are at one end of the spec-
trum (no risk shifted), and traditional HMOs are at the other
(full shifting of the risk).' 3 ' PPOs fall in the middle.
The most common means used by third-party payers to
spread financial risk to providers 3 2 are capitation (set fee per
enrollee), 3 3 withholding (retaining a percentage of payment
127. See generally Capron, supra note 47, at 725; Paul M. Elwood, Jr., When MDs
Meet DRGs, HosPrrALs, Dec. 16, 1983, at 62-63; E. Haavi Morreim, The MD and the
DRG, HASTINGS CENTER REP., June 1985, at 30, 34-35.
128. Rewards can be a predetermined fixed dollar amount, a fixed percentage of
the surplus distributed among the risk pool, a bonus based on a physician's
productivity, or a combination of methods. Alan L. Hillman, Financial Incentives for
Physicians in HMOs: Is There a Conflict of Interest?, 317 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1743, 1746
(1987). The methods also include increasing fee schedules and allowing practitioners to
become investors.
129. Third-party payers often provide for a portion of payments to providers to be
withheld. Other mechanisms used to place the provider at risk include (1) increasing
the percentage of payment withheld the following year, (2) placing liens on future
earnings, (3) decreasing the amount of the capitation payment the following year, (4)
excluding the provider from the program, (5) reducing the distributions from surplus,
and (6) requiring providers to pay either the entire amount of any deficit or some set
percentage of the deficit. Id. at 1745.
130. For example, approximately 40% of managed care products require primary
care physicians to pay for outpatient laboratory tests directly out of their capitation
payments. Id. at 1746. HMOs also use peer pressure as a significant motivator. They
develop a reporting system that informs providers of their performance compared with
that of their peers. The reporting identifies areas of excessive costs and service
intensity. Bischoff, supra note 57, at 12-13.
131. Powers, supra note 64, at 289-90.
132. See Alan M. Gnessin, Liability in the Managed Care Setting, in MANAGED
HEALTH CARE 1988: LEGAL AND OPERATIONAL IssuEs, at 405, 414 (PLI Commercial Law
and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 471, 1988), available in WESuLAw, TP-All
File.
133. A provider, or provider group, is paid a capitation fee per enrollee. The
provider group then provides all necessary physician services. Primary care physicians
are the gatekeepers to specialists and hospital services and are financially responsible
for utilization. Because the amount of payment to the provider group is independent of
the actual services rendered, the group takes on the risks of an insurer. Powers, supra
note 64, at 298-99; Capron, supra note 47, at 726.
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due to reward or punish use trends at year-end), 134 discounted
fees for services (provider required to give a discount to the
third-party payer on amounts due), 13 5 per diem payments (flat
fee per day per patient),3 6 and profit sharing. 37 To shift the
risk to hospitals, third-party payers also use per case mecha-
nisms 138 and capitated payments per patient. 39
While the form may vary, the penalties have similar effects.
For instance, third-party payers indirectly penalize physicians
by giving them less profit or directly penalize them by reducing
capitation payments each time they make inappropriate refer-
rals. Not all risk-shifting mechanisms, however, have the same
impact. Some have a greater potential than others to cause the
physician to act inconsistently with the patient's best inter-
ests. 40  For instance, mechanisms like physician diagnosis-
related groups and capitation require the physician to bear indi-
134. Managed care products can shift the risk by withholding part of the provider's
periodic fee-for-service payments for a claim period. The managed care products
usually withhold from 5% to 20%. At the end of a claim period, a medical claim trend is
determined and compared to a target medical claim trend. If the actual medical claim
trend is lower than the target, the withheld funds are paid to the providers. If the
actual medical claim trend exceeds the target, the withheld funds are paid to the third-
party payer. Powers, supra note 64, at 283-84, 300-301.
135. The managed care product assumes the risk that the third-party payer's
premium will be sufficient to cover hospital charges. However, there is no participation
by hospitals in profits of the managed care products. Third-party payers that contract
with hospitals without a discount may pressure those hospitals for a discount, but
discounted charges may be insufficient to cover the hospital's actual costs. Id. at 294.
136. Hospitals are paid a flat rate per patient per day, which must cover all
necessary services. The advantage of per diem payments is that the hospital is not at
risk for the length of stay. However, if the managed care product also has an emphasis
on early discharge, the hospital's total income may be reduced. This reduction can occur
when the predetermined per diem payments are too low for the hospital to cover its
costs and the managed care product requires discharge of the patient before the hospital
can break even by averaging cheaper end-of-stay days with the more expensive
beginning-of-stay days. Id. at 294-95.
137. Barry S. Scheur & John H. Hoskins, New Concepts in Physician
Reimbursement, in MANAGED HEALTH CARE 1988: LEGAL AND OPERATIONAL IssuEs, at
167, 177-78 (PLI Commercial Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 471, 1988),
available in WESTLAW, TP-ALL File.
138. Case mechanisms are similar to diagnosis-related groups. See supra note 60.
Based on the diagnosis, a predetermined amount is paid to the hospital for each
admission. The hospital is then at risk for the treatment and the length of stay.
Powers, supra note 64, at 295-96.
139. A hospital is paid a lump sum per enrollee in the hospital's service area to
provide all covered hospital services required by those enrollees. Because the hospital's
payments are independent of the actual services rendered by the hospital, the hospital
assumes the role of an insurer. Id. at 296-97.
140. All methods of payment implicitly involve financial incentives. The fee for
service method provides as much incentive to overutilize as withholding can provide to
underutilize. Alan L. Hillman et al., How Do Financial Incentives Affect Physicians'
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vidual loss.' 4 ' Consequently, these methods produce the great-
est risk of undertreatment.
Because many diseases and health conditions have wide
variation in treatment, the loss to the physician can be signifi-
cant. 1 4 2 On the other hand, if the financial risk shifting places
the risk on the organization employing the physician, that risk
shifting is less likely to interfere with the physician's attempts
to act in the patient's best interest. 14  Finally, cost contain-
ment efforts that place explicit restrictions on the physician's
decision making are less likely to result in injury than cost con-
tainment efforts whose effects may be hidden from the patient,
from the physician, and from society. 144
Most plans do not place providers at individual risk. Nev-
ertheless, third-party payers encourage competition among
providers by basing the provider's financial rewards or penal-
ties on the utilization experience of the individual provider in
relation to the group.
At what point does a financial incentive create a conflict of
interest, in which physicians' behavior may be motivated sub-
stantially by pecuniary self-interest rather than by the
patient's best interest? .... As [managed care products] con-
tinue to grow and as more physicians continue to sign con-
tracts with them, these concerns will intensify.' 45
C. Effects of Cost Containment Measures on Health Care
Cost containment activities affect health care systems in
several ways. First, cost containment can affect the quality of
care received by patients. Second, financial risk shifting
changes the fundamental ethical basis of the health care sys-
tem. Finally, cost containment potentially restricts access not
only to types of services but to minorities, underserved popula-
tions, and others who already have limited access.
Clinical Decisions and the Financial Performance of Health Maintenance Organizations,
321 Naw ENG. J. MED. 56, 86 (1990).
141. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
142. See Capron, supra note 47, at 735-36 (noting the wide variations in
treatment).
143. Id. at 749-50.
144. Id. at 750.
145. Hillman, supra note 128, at 1744.
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1. Assuring Quality Care in the Managed Care Product
Quality health care requires a high level of health care
services that assist an individual in remaining free from physi-
cal and mental incapacity while maximizing social capacity. In
a third-party payer-driven market, the main challenge is struc-
turing quality assurance activities to protect quality care in the
face of counterproductive financial incentives. 146 The Council
on Medical Service for the AMA (the Council) defines high qual-
ity care as that which "consistently contributes to improvement
or maintenance of the quality and/or duration of life." 147
Another definition of quality care is the "component of the dif-
ference between efficacy and effectiveness that can be attrib-
uted to care providers, taking into account the environment in
which they work. " 148 Both definitions are strikingly nonspecific
and create, rather than solve, problems of definition. In an
effort to help clarify its definition, the Council established eight
factors that it believes are necessary for quality care delivery:
(1) the production of optimum improvement in the patient's
physical condition and comfort;
(2) the promotion of prevention and early detection of
disease;
(3) the timely discontinuation of unnecessary care;
(4) the cooperation and participation of the patient in the
care process;
(5) the skilled use of necessary professional and technological
resources;
(6) concern for the patient's welfare;
(7) efficient use of resources; and
(8) sufficient documentation of medical records to ensure con-
tinued care and for evaluation of the care by peer
review. 149
Physicians have long had a concern for quality care. 50
Many believe that the quality of care must suffer to achieve cost
146. Ossario, supra note 3, at 199-200.
147. Burgess, supra note 94, at 289 (quoting AMA Council on Medical Service,
Quality of Care, 256 JAMA 1032 (1986) [hereinafter Quality of Care]).
148. Id. at 289 n.120 (quoting Quality Medical Care: Empiricism u. The Gestalt, in
NATIONAL HEALTH LAWYERS AssocIATION 1987 HEALTH LAw UPDATE 1.3 (1987)).
149. Id. at 289 (citing Quality of Care, supra note 147, at 1032).
150. For instance, physicians reviewed the competence of their peers through state
agencies and local medical societies. Similarly, hospitals monitored medical staff
performance to maintain accreditation and minimize liability. Betsy A. Rosen,
Comment, The 1985 Medical Malpractice Reform Act: The New York State Legislature
Responds to the Medical Malpractice Crisis with a Prescription for Comprehensive
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control. 15 1 Unfortunately, there is very little information avail-
able about quality assurance in managed care products.' 5 2 The
absence of well-defined standards in an industry bent on cut-
ting costs poses serious problems for patients. 153 Historically,
we have seen how the profit motive worked to increase utiliza-
tion.'54 There is no reason to think that similar dysfunctions
will not occur in a system designed to enhance profits by
decreasing utilization. Cost containment is the raison d'6tre for
third-party payers. Without comprehensive utilization review
and financial risk shifting, third-party payers cannot contain
costs. 1 55 But if cost containment becomes simply an excuse for
sacrificing quality care, those whose benefit should be the focus
of the entire system-the patients-will suffer.
To argue that patients have a choice and can seek care
outside the plan is unrealistic and even irrational. In reality,
many individuals must forego uncovered treatment because of
financial constraints. 156 Furthermore, providers influenced by
financial concerns may not even offer uncovered treatment to
particular patients.157
Some argue that if society intends to influence provider
behavior and thus create a risk to the individual patient, rea-
sonable behavior based on that influence should be a defense to
a medical malpractice claim.' 58 If reasonable cost containment
Reform, 52 BRooK. L. REv. 135, 144-45 n.49 (1986); see Quality of Care, supra note 147,
at 1032.
151. See Wendy Parmet, The Impact of Health Insurance Reform on the Law
Governing the Physician Patient Relationship, 268 JAMA 3468, 3468 (1992); Virendra
Sayena, Putting Out the Flames that Threaten Medicine, AM. MED. NEWS, Mar. 22,
1993, at 31, available in WESTAw, Hpd File.
152. See Burgess, supra note 94, at 288-91. This is in part due to the difficulty of
defining and measuring quality. As a result, managed care products have had
substantial flexibility in setting quality assurance standards. Id. at 292.
153. Id.
154. For instance, a California study found that for-profit hospitals had the highest
rate of repeat Cesarean sections. HEALTH LAw. NEWS REP., supra note 3, at 5.
155. Burgess, supra note 94, at 292. In fact, insufficient financial incentives have
been connected with the breakdown of several managed care products including
SAFECO's United Health Care Experiment. See generally Steven S. Sharfstein,
Financial Incentives for Alternatives to Hospital Care, 8 PsYcHIATRc CLINIcs OF N. AM.
449-60 (1985).
156. Maureen E. Corcoran, Liability for Care in the Managed Care Setting, in
MANAGED HEALTH CARE 1988: LEGAL AND OPERATIONAL IssuEs, at 425, 427 (PLI
Commercial Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 471, 1988), available in
WESTLAw, TP-All File.
157. Id.
158. E.g., Morreim, supra note 3, at 1719 (arguing that the presumption of a
unitary standard of care be refutable by appropriate evidence of economic constraints).
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was a valid defense to malpractice, however, what would hap-
pen to the patient injured by cost containment efforts? It is
unfair to both encourage and entice providers to practice cost
control and then to hold them individually responsible for con-
sequent injuries. But it is no more fair to allow the injuries of
innocent patients to go uncompensated. Current legal theories
are neither adequate to encourage third-party payers to act cau-
tiously, nor are they adequate to shift the burden of proof.'5 9
Thus, if legal theories remain unchanged, it appears inevitable
that the quality of care will change, resulting in significant bur-
dens on patients and providers. These burdens will appear
unless third-party payers are held responsible for structuring
systems that maintain quality care while containing costs.
Yet, these quality care systems do not appear to be develop-
ing.160 An overwhelming obsession with cost containment has
caused developers of managed care products to essentially
ignore quality assurance. The products, specific and detailed in
their utilization requirements, generally address the issue of
quality care in a vague and nonspecific manner. For instance,
typical contract language states that "the provider is solely
responsible for the quality of services rendered to a member."'
This shifting of total responsibility for quality to providers is
unacceptable. Third-party payers are using financial incentives
to deliberately influence providers' behavior to emphasize cost
containment, possibly at the expense of quality care, while at
the same time contractually passing the buck for the conse-
quences of that emphasis. The government has made only min-
imal efforts to regulate managed care products. Instead,
because managed care products focus on cost containment, the
159. See infra part IV.
160. HMOs are required to administer comprehensive quality assurance to meet
statutory and regulatory requirements. Burgess, supra note 94, at 289. Consequently,
the National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA), incorporated in 1979, has
established standards to measure HMOs. Id. at 289-90. However, those standards tend
to be targeted on organizational issues and administrative and clinical problems. Id. at
289-91. Another method suggested for monitoring and assessing quality of care is the
use of audit reports. Independent physicians examine the managed care products'
medical records after the patient is discharged. Id. at 290; see Arnold Milstein et al.,
Auditing Quality of Care: An Employer Based Approach, Bus. & HEALTH, July-Aug.
1986, at 10. While audits may provide performance snapshots of quality of care, they do
not necessarily identify what the quality of care should be. The AMA has proposed that
the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals be given the sole authority to
develop standards of care for the health care industry. Burgess, supra note 94, at 290-
91.
161. Stevens, supra note 98, at 9 (emphasis omitted).
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government has encouraged their growth and is reluctant to
regulate. 162
If society desires to reduce costs by changing providers'
behavior, it must also establish legal safeguards to deal with
predictable adverse consequences of that altered behavior. Sev-
eral consequences are predictable: (1) Third-party payers will
place increasingly effective utilization review and risk-shifting
requirements on providers to cut costs and to increase profits;
(2) Some third-party payers will attempt to increase profits by
placing increasingly severe penalties and incentives on provid-
ers; 6 ' (3) Some providers will respond to the risk-shifting
incentives by cutting out not only unnecessary services but also
by eliminating some marginally necessary services and even
some medically necessary care; and (4) Some determinations by
utilization review agencies will be made arbitrarily or solely on
the basis of cost. It is also predictable that some individuals
will be injured because they do not receive necessary care.
Given these predictable problems, we should not allow a system
to develop that places the risk of injuries from cost containment
on the individual rather than on society.
2. Maintaining the Ethical Basis of Health Care
There is a danger that financial risk shifting will under-
mine the fundamental ethical basis of the health care system.
Historically, the health care system has been based on a belief
in the sanctity of the physician-patient relationship. Physicians
have had an ethical and legal responsibility to act in the
patient's best interest. In addition, although access has not
been actually assured, Americans have often articulated a belief
that access to health care is a fundamental right.16 4 Any risk
shifting by third-party payers to physicians and hospitals will
necessarily impact these beliefs. 165 Yet, the third-party payers'
162. Burgess, supra note 94, at 291-92. Twenty-two states actually have enacted
enabling statutes for PPOs, but only fourteen have included provisions to protect
consumers. Of those fourteen, only two states, Utah and Michigan, have quality
assurance provisions that require PPOs to establish programs to review care or
services. Id.
163. Managed care products are increasingly important to providers as more and
more of their patients are affiliated with one plan or another. Hillman, supra note 128,
at 1747.
164. See generally Kenneth R. Wing, The Right to Health Care, 2 ANNALs HEALTH
L. 161 (1993).
165. Capron, supra note 47, at 739-40.
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inducements to physicians are, as one author has stated, "bla-
tantly unethical." 6 '
Without a mechanism for quality control, it [is] blatantly
unethical to entice physicians to alter their approach to
patient care through either the prospect of personal financial
gain or peer-group pressure. A patient comes to a physician
to receive an expert opinion-an objective assessment of a
particular problem or the best therapy. To have that opinion
colored by external incentives ... creates an unethical con-
flict of interest that is potentially dangerous to the patient.
In addition, [it] further [deteriorates] the medical profession
in the public opinion .... [The] patient's welfare must be the
physician's main concern. 167
The ethical basis of the health care system is necessarily
founded on a certain amount of trust. 16  When a patient seeks
care from a physician, the patient must believe that the physi-
cian will act in the patient's best interest and will not put other
interests before that of the patient. The patient usually does
not have the training to judge the reasonableness of the physi-
cian's decisions about her health care needs and alternative
means of meeting those needs.1 69 Thus, the physician, not the
166. Geoffrey Modest, Financial Incentives and Performance of Health
Maintenance Organizations, 322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 62, 63 (1990) (letter to editor).
167. Id.
168. Capron, supra note 47, at 737-39. Some authors view trust as a basis for a
contractual relationship. E.g., CHARLES FRIED, CONRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 16 (1981).
Implicit in such a contract is that the physician can be trusted to treat the
patient's health needs and interest as central, thus minimizing the need for the
patient to be defensive or to withhold information. Both the status of the
physician and the ethical bases of his practice facilitate the patient's
willingness to put his health in the hands of the physician with little demand
for detailed explanations or monitoring of the physician's decisions. This is not
to imply that physicians have always conformed to these ethical mandates or
that patients have generally been docile, but only that the physician's
authority has been assumed to be part of the ordinary understanding of
relationships between physicians and patients and their respective
responsibilities.
David Mechanic, Therapeutic Relationship; Contemporary Sociological Analysis, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BioETmcs 1688 (Warren T. Reich ed., 1978), quoted in Capron, supra
note 47, at 737 n.113. The courts have also recognized this trust relationship: "The
patient's reliance upon the physician is a trust of the kind which traditionally has
exacted obligations beyond those associated with arms-length transactions. His depen-
dence upon the physician for information affecting his well-being, in terms of contem-
plated treatment, is well-nigh abject." Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782 (D.C.
Cir. 1972).
169. Capron, supra note 47, at 738.
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patient, combines the components of care into treatment. It is
essential that the patient trust that the physician will primum
non nocere-first do no harm.170
This trust will clearly be undermined by cost containment
efforts. 7 Even the suspicion that physicians no longer act in
patients' best interest will cause anxiety and increase distrust.
When there are actual injuries, the distrust will be reaffirmed
and intensified. As the distrust becomes more and more signifi-
cant, distrust may further exacerbate any unfavorable health
outcomes.
3. Maintaining Access to Health Care
Changing the payment structure and the underlying sys-
tem motivations not only affects quality and the physician-
patient relationship, it also negatively affects access to health
care. This is no small issue because access to health care is
already a significant problem for many Americans. 172
Access problems caused by cost containment efforts occur
in several ways. The first occurs when plans have systemic var-
iations in the level of financial protection for the individual
against health care costs. 173 Under those circumstances, access
will be affected as patients' ability to afford health care
changes. Furthermore, as plans further shift financial risk to
providers, patient access will be affected as providers who are
intent on avoiding cost containment penalties or obtaining cost
containment rewards do not order services for patients. 74
170. See id. at 737-38.
171. See id. at 738.
172. At any one time, up to 25 million Americans lack health insurance. That
amounts to about 11% to 12% of the noninstitutionalized population. Because of loss of
coverage or change of employment status, in any given year over 16% of Americans will
not have insurance. Id. at 740-41 n.119.
173. Individuals and agencies engaged in utilization review traditionally maintain
that they make their decisions for the limited purpose of determining payment, not for
the purposes of determining the course of treatment or access to care. Hinden & Elden,
supra note 97, at 54. "Just because we refuse to pay for the service," the argument goes,
"does not mean the patient cannot get whatever treatment she desires." Even if that
argument had any validity, the reality is that for many people a denial of payment is a
denial of treatment. Id. Thus, a health care system based on third-party payers that
ration health care resources on the basis of ability to pay will exacerbate the problem of
access. Morreim argues that these changes in the health care delivery system will more
heavily burden the indigent. She argues that the problem is not so much one of
"pervasive resource shortage" but of "stratified scarcity." Morreim, supra note 3, at
1722.
174. If different cost containment programs produce markedly different financial
rewards for physicians, then physicians are likely to refuse to participate in programs or
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Thus, the effectiveness of a plan's cost containment efforts will
affect the patients' ability to obtain certain health care services.
In addition, third-party payers can control costs by severely lim-
iting the availability of certain resources. 175 Finally, access will
be limited by differences in the quality of services. If patients
perceive a managed care product to provide poor services, they
are likely to forego the services, even though no other services
may be available.1 76
to serve the subscribers of those programs that pay them less. Capron, supra note 47, at
751-52; Rand E. Rosenblatt, Dual Track Health Care-The Decline of the Medicaid
Cure, 44 U. CrN. L. Rxv. 643, 644-45 (1975). Thus, financial risk shifting will widen the
gaps between tiers of a multi-tier health care system. At the top tier will be those
individuals and companies who can afford to pay top premium for their care. Third-
party payers will translate the high premium into better financial payments to the
physicians. Better payments to physicians will mean more physicians willing to serve
the particular population and, consequently, access to a broader range of health care
services. At the bottom tier will be tax-based systems like Medicare and Medicaid that
severely restrict payments to physicians. These lower payments will translate into
fewer providers and fewer services. Thus, the quality of care that the patient receives is
likely to be influenced by the payment source. A study of the hospital records of almost
600,000 patients found a marked difference in outcomes for those who had health
insurance and those who lacked it. The uninsured were 1.2 to 3.2 times more likely to
die than the insured. HEALTH LAW. NEws RP., supra note 3, at 4. As health care costs
rise, third-party payers will tend to make annual changes to reflect the previous year's
experience. Products with the most effective utilization review process are likely to
make fewer changes. Still, some programs are likely to make changes frequently.
Annual program changes are disruptive, and physicians are likely to avoid serving the
patients of a plan that changes often or to leave the system entirely. Capron, supra note
47, at 751-52. For example, the annual program changes that have occurred in
Medicare in recent years as a part of congressional budget-balancing efforts have seen
an exodus of physicians. Id. Programs that serve the poor are more likely to make
annual changes because of smaller profit margins in the care of that population.
175. Alternative sources of care cannot be expected to fill the gaps of access created
by the withdrawal of physicians who do not believe that a particular program rewards
them sufficiently. As noted by one author, "patients with 'substandard' third-party
reimbursement rates have difficulty commanding the attention, much less the loyalty of
many physicians." Id. at 747; see also Peter H. Elias, Physicians Who Limit Their Office
Practice to Insured and Paying Patients, 314 NEw ENG. J. MED. 391 (1986) (letter to
editor). Cost containment measures that shift financial risks of treating patients from
the third-party payer to the provider may have an effect on access to care that other
types of cost containment efforts will not have. Capron, supra note 47, at 751-53.
Providers might overcome price-lowering efforts by increasing the number of service
units. However, they can only beat risk shifting by excluding high risk patients from
their practice. See id. at 728. But see Harold S. Luft, Health Maintenance
Organizations and the Rationing of Medical Care, 60 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 268,
299 (1982) (arguing that providers' disinclination to serve certain populations might be
overcome if a higher premium is charged for those enrolled). For example, some cost
containment efforts have disincentives that penalize the physician for accepting the
sickest and poorest patient, "the very ones who have the hardest time obtaining health
care." Capron, supra note 47, at 752.
176. See Capron, supra note 47, at 742.
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A utilization review's prospective decision is fundamentally
different in its impact on the beneficiary than a retrospective
decision. 177  While in both instances, patients theoretically
know what treatments their plan will pay for, the plans' effects
on patient behavior are significantly different. In the retrospec-
tive system,'17  a patient makes a decision about medical care
and receives the medical care with only a potential risk of disal-
lowance. 1 79 On the other hand, in a prospective system,'8 0 a
patient knows in advance of treatment that the third-party
payer will not pay for the recommended treatment. The
patient's only chance of recovering the cost of that recom-
mended treatment, if she can now even obtain it, is in a chal-
lenge to the third-party payer's decision.' 8 ' Thus, a patient in
the prospective system is less likely to pursue treatment options
not authorized by the plan.18 2
By shifting incentives and creating the disincentive that
results from having one's own finances at risk, the new meth-
ods of provider reimbursement turn providers into gatekeep-
ers for the health care system. Their decisions would no
longer be based on medical criteria alone (i.e., "does this
medicine have something to offer this patient?") but would
now take into account their own financial risk if they admit
patients into the system whose care costs more than insur-
ance will pay.18 3
These considerations may undermine both the patients' trust in
the system and the patients' access to care.
D. Summary
No matter how risk shifting reimbursement schemes are
viewed, they will eventually alter the perceptions and expecta-
tions of society, physicians, patients, and third-party payers
about what is owed to whom, what treatments are appropriate
in what circumstances, and even what qualifies as a disease.18 4
These altered perceptions may create a denial of access on the
ground that a patient's condition is not meaningful in cost con-
177. Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1331 (5th Cir. 1992).
178. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
179. Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1332.
180. See supra notes 111-112 and accompanying text.
181. Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1332.
182. Id.
183. Capron, supra note 47, at 753.
184. Id. at 749.
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tainment terms, without regard to an assessment of whether
the patient's condition is individually meaningful. If a denial of
appropriate medical care results in injury because of cost con-
tainment efforts, who shall bear the burden? If cost contain-
ment is an important social goal, then the cost of injuries
created by it should be spread throughout society.18 5 Unfortu-
nately, traditional tort theories of liability are inadequate to
spread the cost throughout society, promote safety, or compen-
sate patients.
IV. TRADITIONAL THEORIES OF LIABILITY
Third-party payers using managed care products induce,
through utilization review and financial risk shifting, health
care providers to make health care decisions based on economic
pressures. If those decisions result in injury to the patient,
under what theory, if any, can a third-party payer be held lia-
ble? If theories producing liability exist, a more important issue
is whether they will have the effect of promoting safety and
spreading the cost of injuries. There are several theories of lia-
bility for injury that might be adaptable to cover the problems
created by the peculiar relationships among providers, patients,
and third-party payers.
Both insurance and managed care products are in perverse
relationships with providers in that they can cause providers to
act in unacceptable ways. With insurance, the problem of moral
hazard exists. Insurance causes the physician to provide serv-
ices without regard to cost. Managed care, on the other hand,
may cause providers to deny services without regard to need
because they act in the best interest of the third-party payer. In
a health care system that emphasizes acting in the patient's
best interest, current legal theories are adequate. But these
theories are inadequate when applied to the perverse relation-
ship between providers and third-party payers. Current legal
theories fail to cause third-party payers to act with care when
designing utilization review programs or when giving financial
incentives to providers to act in the third-party payers' best
interest. Furthermore, because patients infrequently recover
185. Soon third-party payers will routinely withhold (or decline to pay for)
interventions that might benefit certain patients but that simply cost too much because
society collectively may choose not to "check on physicians' temptation to place their
own interest ahead of their patients' interests. Instead society [attempts] to use
physicians' selfish motivation to restrain full pursuit of patients' interest." Id. at 749.
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from third-party payers under current theories, the theories fail
to meet the goal of spreading the risk to those who create it.
This Part discusses the inadequacy of four traditional theo-
ries as they might be applied to cost containment efforts. Sec-
tion A discusses negligence or direct liability for utilization
review and financial risk shifting activities. Section B considers
the effectiveness of the corporate negligence doctrine in com-
pensating for cost containment injuries. Section C contem-
plates the use of the doctrine of respondeat superior. Section D
describes the use of the ostensible agency doctrine to compen-
sate for cost containment effects. These traditional theories of
liability are inadequate when applied to cost containment
efforts because they fail to adequately promote safety, spread
the risk, and compensate patients.
A. Negligence (or Direct Liability) for Injuries Caused by
Cost Containment Measures
A party can be held liable for injuries caused by its failure
to conform to a standard of care, that is, when the party has
been negligent. Negligence, as a theory, has proved inadequate
as a risk spreader in health care primarily because medical
practice is as much an art as a science.18 6 Consequently, the
current tort system has difficulty distinguishing between medi-
cal judgment and negligent conduct.
Should a CAT scan be performed to detect the unlikely tumor,
even though such a test is expensive and carries with it a
small risk of complications including death? ... Should the
physician forego the test if the best clinical judgment so dic-
tates, or is the doctor better off ordering the test anyway to
protect against a malpractice suit in the event a tumor actu-
ally is present?' 87
By deferring to professional practice, negligence theories
allow the profession to define the standard of care. Thus, the
negligence approach places the patient at a theoretical disad-
vantage because distinguishing between a judgment call and
negligence depends in large part on for whose benefit an expert
witness is testifying. Consequently, many injured patients do
not file negligence claims, in part because of the problem of
186. S.Y. Tan, Comment, The Medical Malpractice Crisis: Will No-Fault Cure the
Disease?, 9 U. HAw. L. REv. 241, 246 (1987).
187. Id.
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proving negligence."' Of those who actually file suit, many
patients are not able to establish fault.'8 9 Finally, even if the
injured patient wins at trial, it usually takes many years of liti-
gation before she is compensated. 190 Thus, under the present
negligence scheme, compensation resembles a tort lottery.' 91
As such, negligence theory is an unreliable source of compensa-
tion for patients, including those injured by third-party cost
containment efforts.
Third-party cost containment efforts further complicate
this situation because they push more of the provider's practice
from clearly negligent behavior to judgment calls. As cost con-
tainment measures become more and more prevalent, a compo-
nent of the standard of reasonable care will necessarily be
whether the physician acted in reliance on reasonable cost con-
tainment efforts. The leading case as to third-party payer lia-
bility for cost containment through utilization review and
financial risk shifting activity is Wilson v. Blue Cross.19 2
In Wilson v. Blue Cross, Mr. Wilson, the decedent, had an
insurance contract with Alabama Blue Cross, which was admin-
istered by Inter-plan Service Benefit Bank. 193 California Blue
Cross provided the benefits of the insurance contract between
Alabama Blue Cross and Mr. Wilson.194 The contract provided
inpatient hospital benefits as follows:
INPATIENT HOSPITAL SERVICE.
While a Member is covered under this Contract and is a
registered bed patient in a Hospital, and during such time
(subject to the limitations, exclusions, and conditions pre-
scribed elsewhere herein) as the Member's attending physi-
cian determines that hospitalization is necessary, such
188. Id. at 243.
189. Jeffery O'Connell, It's Time For No Fault For All Kinds Of Injuries, 60 JAMA
1070 (1974); Tan, supra note 186, at 246; see Clark C. Havighurst, 'Medical Adversity
Insurance"--Has Its Time Come?, 1975 DuKE L.J. 1233.
190. Personal injuries are adjudicated in an average of seven years. Only half of all
malpractice cases are closed within 18 months after they are opened, and 10% remain
open over 6 and a half years. Tan, supra note 186, at 243 n.13.
191. Estimates of the medical malpractice tort system returns on the premium
dollar range from 28 cents to 35 cents. Henson Moore & Jeffery O'Connell, Foreclosing
Medical Malpractice Claims By Prompt Tender Of Economic Loss, 44 LA. L. REV. 1267,
1270 (1984) (28 cents); William B. Schwartz & Neil K Komesar, Doctors, Damages and
Deterrence: An Economic View of Medical Malpractice, 298 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1282,
1282 (1978) (35 cents).
192. 271 Cal. Rptr. 876 (Ct. App. 1990).
193. Id. at 880.
194. Id. at 878.
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Member shall be entitled to the following benefits, herein
referred to as Hospital Service .... 195
Benefits for mental and nervous disorders were provided as
follows:
BENEFITS FOR MENTAL AND NERVOUS DISORDERS
OR FOR PULMONARY TUBERCULOSIS.
Benefits hereunder for mental and nervous disorders or
for pulmonary tuberculosis shall be limited to an aggregate of
thirty (30) days during any period of twelve (12) consecutive
months.' 9 6
Nothing in the insurance contract permitted review by an
outside entity of an attending physician's conclusion that hospi-
talization was necessary. 197 In 1983, Western Medical, a utili-
zation review consulting firm, contracted with California Blue
Cross to perform "utilization review of the 'medical necessity'"
of hospitalization. 9 ' Western Medical did not have a contract
with Alabama Blue Cross.199
Mr. Wilson suffered from major depression, drug depen-
dency, and excessive weight loss. He was admitted to College
Hospital on March 1, 1983.200 His treating physician, Dr. Taff,
decided that Mr. Wilson needed three to four weeks of inpatient
care at the hospital.2° ' Western Medical performed a "concur-
rent review" using federal Medicare regulations and decided
that the hospitalization was not medically necessary.20 2 Ten
days later, Mr. Wilson's insurance company refused to pay for
any further hospital care.203 Because neither Mr. Wilson nor
his family could afford to pay for any further inpatient hospital
care, 204 Dr. Taff discharged him without appealing Western
195. Id. at 880 (emphasis added).
196. Id.
197. Id. at 881.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 877, 881.
201. Id. at 882.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. When Mr. Wilson was informed that he would "not be covered financially by
his insurance company and that the liability [for hospital costs] would then be his," he
cried while talking to an aunt. Id. Mr. Wilson's aunt said that the family did not have
enough money to pay for the cost of inpatient hospitalization and that Dr. Taff told her
"to come and get him." Id. Further, she testified that Dr. Taff told Mr. Wilson's mother
and father that Western Medical "terminated his [the decedent's] stay" and that this
was a "problem" that had occurred on other occasions. Id.
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Medical's utilization review.2" 5 On March 31, 1983, Mr. Wilson
committed suicide. 0°
In a suit brought by Mr. Wilson's father, the trial court
issued summary judgment for Blue Cross on the ground that
Wickline v. State2" 7 controlled. The appellate court reversed
and remanded, holding that a triable issue existed as to
whether the conduct of Blue Cross was a substantial factor in
causing the decedent's death. 0 8 Wickline, the appellate court
reasoned, erred in relieving the third-party payer from liabil-
ity.20 9 The Wilson court reasoned correctly. The purpose of
utilization review is to affect providers' decisions regarding
medical services. When the system works appropriately, third-
party payers reap the cost containment benefits. Having ini-
tially injected cost containment into medical decision making,
third-party payers should not be allowed to cloak themselves
with immunity merely because the providers acceded to the cost
containment decision of the third-party payer.
Wickline involved three key components, legal and factual,
that the Wilson opinion specifically distinguished. First, Wic-
kline held that as a matter of law, the discharge decision by the
attending physician met the medical standard of care for physi-
cians.210 The Wilson court distinguished Wickline on this point
205. Id.
206. Id. at 878.
207. 239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Ct. App. 1986). In Wickline, Ms. Wickline's physician
requested an eight-day extension of her stay in the hospital. Medi-Cal denied the
request and authorized an additional four days of hospital stay beyond the originally
scheduled discharge date. Complying with the limited extension authorized by Medi-
Cal, Ms. Wickline was discharged on January 21, 1977. At Ms. Wickline's discharge,
her leg did not appear in any danger. Ms. Wickline began to experience pain and
discoloration soon after arriving home. Nine days after the discharge, she was admitted
to the hospital for clotting in the right leg, no circulation to that leg, and an infection at
the graft site. After unsuccessful attempts to treat Ms. Wickline's conditions, the
doctors amputated her leg above the knee. Id. at 814-17. The court in Wickline held
that a person can recover from a third-party payer only if medically inappropriate
decisions result from defects in design or implementation of cost containment
mechanisms. Id. at 819-20. Such defects are limited to requests for services that are
arbitrarily ignored, unreasonably disregarded, or unreasonably overridden. Id. The
court held that the state had not unreasonably overridden the physician's decision to
discharge Ms. Wickline because the physician had not pursued every avenue of appeal
and complied with the third-party payer's decision without protest. Id. The physician
could be held responsible for the injury because he failed to protest the third-party
payer's decision through all possible steps. Id.
208. Wilson, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 885.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 883. The Medi-Ca standard for determining whether to provide acute
care was essentially the same as the medical standard of care. Id. at 879.
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by noting that no evidence indicated that the discharge decision
was within the medical standard of care. 211 To the contrary,
Dr. Taff testified that reasonable treatment required inpatient
treatment on March 11, 1983, and that had Mr. Wilson com-
pleted his planned hospitalization, there was a reasonable med-
ical probability that he would not have committed suicide.2t 2
Second, in Wickline, the funding process was based on the
state's statutory rather than contractual duty to provide
funds.213 Wilson is distinguishable because, in Wilson, neither
a statute nor a regulation affected the duty owed by Blue Cross.
Blue Cross's duty to Wilson was based on contract, while in Wic-
kline, a specific statute allowed the denial of benefits to a per-
son seeking acute hospital care when the denial was "in
accordance with the usual standards of medical practice in the
community."214
Finally, in Wickline, the court held that the Medi-Cal
review process did not "corrupt medical judgment."21 5 In Wil-
son, Blue Cross argued that, as in Wickline, the physician had
sole responsibility for medical treatment decisions.21 6 The Wil-
son court rejected that argument, stating in dicta as follows:
[T]he argument is likewise invalid because it misconstrues
the test for joint liability for tortious conduct. The test for
joint tort liability is set forth in section 431 of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts, which provides, "The actors' negligent
conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if (a) his [or her]
conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm,
and, (b) there is no rule of law relieving the actor from liabil-
ity because of the manner in which his [or her] negligence has
211. See id. at 881-82.
212. Id. at 882.
213. Under the California Civil Code, "[elvery one is responsible, not only for the
result of his [or her] willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned by another by his [or
her] want of ordinary care or skill." Wickline, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 810 (citing Rowland v.
Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968)). As rephrased by the Wickline court, "All persons
are required to use ordinary care to prevent others being injured as a result of their
conduct." Id. "In the absence of statutory provision [sic] declaring an exception to the
fundamental principle enunciated by section 1714 of the Civil Code, no such exception
shall be made unless clearly supported by public policy." Id. at 818. In Wilson,
however, the Welfare and Institutions Code and Title 22 of the California
Administrative Code constituted an exception to the usual standard of tort liability
specified in Civil Code § 1714. Wilson, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 878.
214. Wickline, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 819 (citation omitted).
215. Id. at 820.
216. Wilson, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 883.
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resulted in the harm." Section 431 correctly states California
law about the issue of causation in tort cases. 2 17
Thus, the court held that a third-party payer is responsible
when that third-party payer's actions are a substantial factor in
bringing about the injury.218
The Wilson appellants argued that "public policy considera-
tions which favor the use of the concurrent utilization process
should alter the normal rules of tort liability."2 19 The court
rejected the argument, noting that in Wickline the California
Administrative Code and the Welfare and Institutions Code
mandated the use of utilization review processes. 220 A specific
statute provided for denial of benefits "'in accordance with the
usual standards of medical practice in the community.'" 221 The
court found no "similar clearly expressed public policy that
applies to [Mr. Wilson's] contract with Alabama Blue Cross."222
Finally, Western Medical argued that Dr. Taff had the
responsibility to pursue avenues of appeal when insurance ben-
efits were denied because of the utilization review process.223
The Wilson court again rejected the Wickline dicta stating that
the doctor who "complies without protest with the limitations
imposed by a third-party payer, when [her or] his medical judg-
ment dictates otherwise, cannot avoid his [or her] ultimate
responsibility for her [or his] patient's care."224 The court dis-
tinguished Wilson as involving a claim by a decedent's estate
and relatives directly against insurance companies and their
agents, not against a physician, and stated that the informal
policy allowing for reconsideration by Western Medical did not
warrant granting summary judgment.225 Thus, summary judg-
ment should not have been granted for Western Medical
because there were "triable issues of material fact as to Western
Medical's liability for tortious interference with the contract of
insurance between [Mr. Wilson] and Alabama Blue Cross and
its role in causing the wrongful death of [Mr. Wilson]." 226
217. Id. (citation omitted).
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 879.
221. Id. at 878 (quoting Wickline, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 810).
222. Id. at 884.
223. Id.
224. Id. (quoting Wickline, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 810).
225. Id.
226. Id. at 885.
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By rejecting Wickline, the court brought the issue of third-
party payer liability into focus: Did the third-party payer sub-
stantially cause the injuries to the plaintiff, either negligently
or intentionally (tortiuously)? This is the issue that all courts
should address because, if courts adopt the Wilson reasoning, a
significant step in the right direction would be made. Neverthe-
less, because most courts continue to focus on the character of
the decision-making conduct rather than the inevitability of
effects on the individual patients, the problems of burden of
proof continue to prevent liability from attaching.
The problems surrounding the burden of proof are particu-
larly severe when third-party payers can make the tort system
ineffective by redefining the reasonableness of their behavior in
their favor. This problem is evidenced by the retrial of Wilson,
when the jury found that Blue Cross had not been negligent.227
Thus, even direct liability does not adequately address the goals
of risk spreading and compensation. Such goals can be met only
through an alternative theory of third-party payer liability.
B. Corporate Negligence Doctrine
A health care organization can be held liable not only for its
own negligence causing harm to a patient, but also as a corpo-
rate entity when it fails to adequately protect a patient from
harm by others.228 In the last hundred years, the primary orga-
nizational structure for the delivery of health care has been the
hospital. A hospital's legal duty to patients was based on the
view that a hospital was analogous to an innkeeper in providing
facilities for physicians to practice medicine.229 While the hos-
pital might be liable for harm caused by its physical facilities or
227. Wilson Jury Finds Calif., Ala. Blues Plans Not Liable for Plaintiffs Demise,
MANAGED CARE L. OUTLOOK, Apr. 21, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
CuRRNws File. The jury found that Blue Cross, Blue Shield of Alabama, and Western
Medical Review, Inc. had not caused the plaintiffs wrongful death by refusing to pay for
as long a hospital stay as Mr. Wilson's doctor requested. Id.
228. Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253, 258 (Ill.
1965) (holding that hospitals could be found liable for the negligent selection and
supervision of medical staff members). Whether a physician is an employee or an
independent contractor depends on a number of factors including the degree of control,
method of payment, and the ownership and provision of instrumentalities used by the
physician. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1958); David J. Oakley & Eileen
M. Kelley, HMO Liability for Malpractice of Member Physicians: The Case of IPA Model
HMOs, 23 TORT & INS. L.J. 624, 627-29 (1988); Catherine Butler, Note, Preferred
Provider Organization Liability for Physician Malpractice, 11 Am. J.L. & MED. 345, 350-
54 (1985).
229. Hinden & Elden, supra note 97, at 26.
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its employees, it was deemed powerless to prevent harm at the
hands of the physician.230 Corporate negligence theory replaced
that traditional view with the view that a hospital owes the
patient a separate and independent duty to protect her from
harm.23 ' The hospital's responsibility to the patient extends
beyond merely refraining from causing harm. The duty
includes a number of responsibilities: to provide proper overall
surveillance of the quality of patient care services; 232 to prop-
erly review and investigate the credentials and expertise of
medical staff applicants before granting privileges;23 3 to protect
patients from malpractice by members of its medical staff when,
through reasonable care, it should have known that malpractice
was likely;234 to use reasonable care in maintaining the facility
230. See generally McDonald v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 120 Mass. 432, 436
(1876) (frequently cited case regarding origin of hospital immunity in United States).
231. See generally Hinden & Elden, supra note 97 at 26-27. But see Rhoda v.
Aroostook Gen. Hosp., 226 A.2d 530 (Me. 1967) (holding that the nonliability rule of
charitable immunity extends to shelter a hospital corporate charity from liability for its
own corporate negligent acts, including the selection, training, and supervision or
control of its personnel or employees).
232. Fridena v. Evans, 622 P.2d 463 (Ariz. 1980) (finding that a hospital's duty
includes an obligation to take reasonable steps to monitor and to review the treatment
being received by a patient); Poor Sisters of St. Francis Seraph of the Perpetual
Adoration, Inc. v. Catron, 435 N.E.2d 305 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that a hospital
can be held liable for negligence when a nurse or other hospital employee follows a
doctor's orders despite knowledge that the doctor's orders are not in accordance with
normal medical practice).
233. Jackson v. Power, 743 P.2d 1376 (Alaska 1987) (finding a duty by a hospital to
ensure that physicians granted hospital privileges are competent and to supervise
medical treatment provided by members of its medical staff); Insinga v. LaBella, 543 So.
2d 209 (Fla. 1989) (holding hospital liable for its negligent decision to grant staff
privileges); Joiner v. Mitchell County Hosp. Auth., 186 S.E.2d 307 (Ga. Ct. App. 1971)
(finding that a hospital may be held liable for negligent selection of new staff
physicians, but not when it selects authorized physicians in good standing), affd, 189
S.E.2d 412 (Ga. 1972); Copithorne v. Framingham Union Hosp., 520 N.E.2d 139 (Mass.
1988) (holding hospital liable for the failure to withdraw staff privileges when it has
received notice of the misconduct of a staff physician); Blanton v. Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hosp., Inc., 354 S.E.2d 455 (N.C. 1987) (holding that a hospital owes duty of
care to its patients to ascertain that a doctor is qualified to perform an operation before
granting him the privilege to do so); Corleto v. Shore Memorial Hosp., 350 A.2d 534
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975) (holding a hospital liable for negligent selection and
retention of a staff physician when the physician's incompetence was obvious); Johnson
v. Misericordia Community Hosp., 301 N.W.2d 156 (Wis. 1981) (holding hospital liable
when it failed to exercise reasonable care to determine whether physician was qualified
to receive privileges).
234. Joiner, 186 S.E.2d at 307; see also Sewell v. United States, 629 F. Supp. 448
(W.D. La. 1986) (stating that a hospital can be held liable for a physician's failure to
consult a specialist where the failure was below the appropriate standard of care);
Ingram v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp., 438 N.E.2d 1194 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (holding that a
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and providing medical instruments and equipment;235 and to
use care in selecting and supervising medical personnel.236
In Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital,237
the first and most widely followed corporate negligence case,
the court recognized the hospital's obligation to oversee the
quality of patient care services.
Present-day hospitals, as their manner of operation plainly
demonstrates, do far more than furnish facilities for treat-
ment. They regularly employ on a salary basis a large staff of
physicians, nurses and [interns], as well as administrative
and manual workers, and they charge patients for medical
care and treatment, collecting for such services, if necessary,
by legal action. Certainly, the person who avails himself of
"hospital facilities" expects that the hospital will attempt to
cure him, not that its nurses or other employees will act on
their own responsibility.238
While hospitals are not guarantors of adequate health care,
establishing hospital corporate negligence does not turn on the
relationship between the physician and the hospital.2 3  A pri-
mary justification for the corporate negligence doctrine is the
hospital may be liable for a physician or an agent's misconduct as well as a violation of
its duty to review and supervise medical care).
235. Emory Univ. v. Porter, 120 S.E.2d 668 (Ga. Ct. App. 1961) (holding that a
hospital could be held negligent for failing to furnish adequate equipment); Hamil v.
Bashline, 485 A.2d 1204 (Pa. 1982) (holding that a hospital is under a duty to
adequately procure and maintain equipment).
236. Arthur F. Southwick, The Hospital's New Responsibility, 17 CLEv. MARSHALL
L. REv. 146, 154 (1968); Jacqueline Hanson Dee, Note, Torts--Corporate Negligence-
Wisconsin Hospital Held to Owe a Duty to Its Patients to Select Qualified Physicians, 65
MARQ. L. REV. 139, 143 (1981).
237. 211 N.E.2d 253 (M1l. 1965). In Darling, a plaintiff who broke his leg while
playing in a college football game was awarded $150,000 by a jury after his leg was
amputated because of the attending doctor's negligence. Id. at 255. The court rejected
the historical view of a hospital's limited duty. Id. at 257.
238. Id. (quoting Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3, 8 (N.Y. 1957)).
239. See Purcell v. Zimbelman, 500 P.2d 335, 340-41 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972). In
Purcell, Dr. Purcell, a private practitioner, was selected by Mr. Zimbelman to perform
an abdominal surgical procedure for cancer. As a result of the doctor's negligence, Mr.
Zimbelman lost a kidney, lost sexual function, had a permanent colostomy, and had
urinary problems. Id. at 339-40. The hospital knew that Dr. Purcell's two prior
operations for abdominal cancer using the same procedure had resulted in lawsuits, and
that two other surgical procedures performed by Dr. Purcell had also resulted in
lawsuits. Id. at 343. Even though Dr. Purcell was clearly an independent contractor
and no evidence was presented indicating that he may have been an actual or apparent
agent of the hospital, the hospital was ultimately responsible for the quality of care
provided in the institution. See id. at 341.
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hospital's custody of the patient.24 0 Although a managed care
product does not have custody, the duty to protect from harm
may nevertheless arise from the process of selecting physicians
or other medical personnel for the managed care product. This
is particularly true when the managed care product restricts a
patient's choice of provider. 4 ' Thus, as with hospital liability, a
managed care product should be liable for failing to properly
review and investigate the credentials and expertise of provider
panel applicants,2 4 2 and for failing to protect its subscribers
from malpractice by provider panel members when it knew or
should have known, through reasonable care, that such mal-
practice was likely.243
The court in Harrell v. Total Health Care, Inc. 2 4 4 discussed
the extension of the corporate negligence doctrine to independ-
ent practice association model managed care products.
A subscriber to Total Health Care, or to any other pre-
paid medical services plan, expects and assumes that the
plan will cover the expenses of medical care. To realize the
benefit of the Total Health Care plan, the subscriber must,
under the plan terms, accept treatment by physicians that
Total Health Care has approved. Although Total Health
Care argued otherwise, the evidence shows that a subscriber
does not have unlimited choice of a specialist physician. To
be assured that payment of the charges will be made by Total
Health Care, the subscriber must go to the physician referred
by his primary care physician and the specialist must have
contracted with Total Health Care. Because the subscriber
240. See Reed E. Hall, Hospital Committee Proceedings and Reports: Their Legal
Status, 1 Am. J.L. & MED. 245, 252 (1975) (describing the premise of corporate
negligence as being that the hospital, by virtue of its custody of the patient, owes a duty
to exercise care in the construction, maintenance, and operation of the hospital).
241. Harrell v. Total Health Care, Inc., No. WD 39809, 1989 WL 153066, at *4 (Mo.
Ct. App. Apr. 25, 1989) (The corporate negligence doctrine "is not a theory limited to
claims against hospitals.... The duty of care to protect patients from foreseeable risk of
harm, however, finds a common ground" in both hospitals and IPA model HMOs.).
242. Benedict v. Saint Luke's Hosps., 365 N.W.2d 499, 504-05 (N.D. 1985) (holding
that the hospital will not be liable for negligent selection where the physician exercised
the care and the skill ordinarily possessed by other emergency room physicians).
243. See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
244. 781 S.W.2d 58 (Mo. 1989). In Harrell, the plaintiff brought an action against a
health service corporation alleging damages resulting from alleged malpractice. The
trial court entered summary judgment for the health service corporation. Id. at 60. The
Missouri Supreme Court held that (1) a former statute that exempted health service
corporations from some forms of liability for injuries to patients applied to a patient's
action that alleged that the corporation was negligent in its selection of the surgeon who
treated the patient and (2) the statute was not unconstitutional. Id.
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may select another doctor and pay for the services outside the
Total Health Care coverage is irrelevant.245
Although the court dismissed the case by using a technical
aspect of Missouri law,246 the court's conclusion in Harrell is an
appropriate extension of the corporate negligence doctrine to
HMOs. The court concluded that the plaintiff made a case of
liability for corporate negligence based on proof that (1) Total
Health Care conducted no investigation of the physician's com-
petence, (2) the physician's record of malpractice claims was
such that a prudent person would recognize the physician's lack
of competence, and (3) Total Health Care did not discharge its
duty to the plaintiff as a subscriber to its services to prevent a
foreseeable risk of harm.247
Because many third-party payers market their managed
care products with claims that they determine provider panel
competency, continuously evaluate the physician panel, monitor
provider performance, and take corrective action, courts may
readily extend the corporate negligence doctrine to them.
Even if extended, however, the doctrine suffers from sev-
eral problems. For instance, besides establishing organiza-
tional negligence, the plaintiff must also prove that the
physician was negligent and that the physician's negligence
was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries.2 48 Thus, the
plaintiff faces the difficulty of proving two concurrent negligent
acts to establish liability. The focus, therefore, is on the negli-
gent conduct of the physician and not on the utilization review
process or financial risk shifting.
Thus, even if applied, the corporate negligence doctrine
would do little to promote safe utilization review processes and
limit financial incentives. If the utilization review process is
not negligently designed or conducted, but merely defective,
there will probably be no liability under this doctrine. Under
traditional theories of tort liability, managed care products tend
to decrease physician liability because economic considerations
and the deference given to professional judgment make physi-
cians' actions seem more reasonable. In addition, because
245. Harrell v. Total Health Care, Inc., No. WD 39809, 1989 WL 153066, at *5 (Mo.
Ct. App. Apr. 25, 1989).
246. Id.
247. Id. at *5-*6.
248. Ferguson v. Gonyaw, 236 N.W.2d 543, 550 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975) (finding that
the plaintiff failed to prove that staff privileges would have been denied if the hospital
had used reasonable care in evaluating the physician).
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third-party tortfeasors have always been more difficult to hold
liable, managed care products are rarely viable alternative
sources of recovery. The results are more injuries to patients
and fewer successful lawsuits. As a practical matter, only
twenty jurisdictions have adopted the corporate negligence doc-
trine.2 49 Consequently, even if a managed care product is defec-
tive, the doctrine would have limited effect.
C. Respondeat Superior Doctrine
Another possible theory of liability is the doctrine of
respondeat superior, which holds an entity liable for the negli-
gent acts of an employee arising in the course of his or her
employment. Historically, hospitals, as the primary organiza-
tions for health care delivery, were immune from liability for
the negligent acts of physicians. Even after the demise of the
doctrine of professional skills 2 0 and the doctrine of charitable
immunity, 25 ' hospitals continued to enjoy immunity from liabil-
249. See, e.g., Rule v. Lutheran Hosps. & Homes Soc'y, 835 F.2d 1250 (8th Cir.
1987) (applying Neb. law); Tucson Medical Ctr., Inc. v. Misevch, 545 P.2d 958 (Ariz.
1976); Elam v. College Park Hosp., 183 Cal. Rptr. 156 (Ct. App. 1982); Kitto v. Gilbert,
570 P.2d 544 (Colo. Ct. App. 1977); Register v. Wilmington Medical Ctr., Inc., 377 A.2d 8
(Del. 1977); Insinga v. La Bella, 543 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1989); Joiner v. Mitchell County
Hosp. Auth., 186 S.E.2d 307 (Ga. Ct. App. 1971), affd, 189 S.E.2d 412 (Ga. 1972);
Blanton v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., Inc., 354 S.E.2d 455 (N.C. 1987); Corleto v.
Shore Memorial Hosp., 350 A.2d 534 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975); Lewis v.
Columbus Hosp., 151 N.Y.S.2d 391 (App. Div. 1956); Park North Gen. Hosp. v.
Hickman, 703 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985); Pedroza v. Bryant, 101 Wash. 2d 226,
233, 677 P.2d 166, 170 (1984); Sharsmith v. Hill, 764 P.2d 667 (Wyo. 1988).
250. Under the doctrine of professional skills, courts held that because of a
physician's professional skills, a physician was considered an independent contractor
for whose acts a hospital could not be held liable. See Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y.
Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 92-93 (N.Y. 1914), overruled by Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y.
1957). The New York Court of Appeals overturned the old rule of nonliability, noting
that "[the rule of nonliability is out of tune with the life about us, at variance with
modern day needs and with concepts ofjustice and fair dealing. It should be discarded."
Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3, 9 (N.Y. 1957). Other courts began to reject this doctrine
as they began to recognize hospitals as highly-integrated systems for the delivery of
health care. See Ybarra v. Spangard, 154 P.2d 687, 691 (Cal. 1944) (finding that
hospitals operate under highly-integrated systems of medical health care); Moore v.
Board of Trustees, 495 P.2d 605, 608 (Nev.) (holding that hospitals are highly
integrated community health centers whose sole purpose is to make available the
highest possible quality care to patients), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 879 (1.972).
251. Historically, hospitals maintained as charitable institutions could not be
liable for the negligence of their physicians and nurses in the treatment of patients.
See, e.g., Schloendorff, 105 N.E. at 92-93 (finding no liability though the patient made
some payment to help defray the cost of board); Gartman v. City of McAllen, 107 S.W.2d
879, 880 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1937, opinion adopted by the Texas Supreme Court)
(holding that city hospitals operating solely for public benefit could not be held liable).
However, later courts have uniformly rejected the doctrine. See, e.g., Flagiello v.
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ity for the negligent acts of physicians.2 52 It was not until 1965
that courts began to extend liability to hospitals on some theory
other than the doctrine of respondeat superior.253
Up until that time, liability turned on the character of the
physician-hospital relationship, that is, whether the physician
was an independent contractor or an employee. Hospitals were
not liable for the conduct of physicians who were independent
contractors or who lacked an apparent employment relationship
with the hospital.254 More recently, courts have held a hospital
liable, under certain conditions, for the negligence of a physi-
cian who was an independent contractor.255 The line of respon-
deat superior cases begun in 1965 holds, for example, that a
hospital that negligently selects or retains an independent con-
tractor may be directly liable for injuries resulting from the neg-
ligence of that independent contractor.2 56 Further, a hospital
may be vicariously liable for the negligence of an independent
contractor performing nondelegable duties.25 7 In recent years,
such vicarious liability has also been found under the doctrine
of ostensible agency.25
Pennsylvania Hosp., 208 A.2d 193, 208 (Pa. 1965) (holding that the negligence of a
charitable hospital's employees must be treated the same as the negligence of any other
employer's employee); Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 43 Wash. 2d 162,
174, 260 P.2d 765, 771-75 (1953) (finding charitable hospital liable if its negligence is
the proximate cause of injury); Adkins v. St. Francis Hosp., 143 S.E.2d 154, 163 (W. Va.
1965) (abolishing charitable immunity doctrine, thereby making hospitals liable for
negligent acts committed there).
252. Schloendorff, 105 N.E. at 94 ("The true ground for the [hospital's] exemption
from liability is that the relation between a hospital and its physicians is not that of a
master and servant. The hospital does not undertake to act through them but merely to
procure them to act upon their own responsibility.").
253. See supra part IV.B.
254. A basic principle of tort law is that employers are not liable for the negligence
of an independent contractor. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 409 (1965).
255. See, e.g., Arthur v. St. Peters Hosp., 405 A.2d 443 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1979); Capan v. Divine Providence Hosp., 430 A.2d 647 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980);
Brownsville Medical Ctr. v. Garcia, 704 S.Wo2d 68 (Tx. Ct. App. 1985); Adamski v.
Tacoma Gen. Hosp., 20 Wash. App. 98, 579 P.2d 970 (1978). But see Johnson v. St.
Bernard Hosp., 399 N.E.2d 198 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); Reynolds v. Swigert, 697 P.2d 504
(N.M. Ct. App. 1984).
256. Albain v. Flower Hosp., 553 N.E.2d 1038, 1044 (Ohio 1990).
257. Id.
258. Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253, 257 (Iln.
1965); Arthur, 405 A.2d at 446; Albain, 553 N.E.2d at 1044; Capon, 430 A.2d at 643-49;
Adamski, 20 Wash. App. at 111, 579 P.2d at 977. But see Greene v. Rogers, 498 N.E.2d
867 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986). The Greene court specifically refused to apply apparent agency
to a hospital and emergency room doctor relationship. "The absence of the power to
control the decision making of the emergency room physicians demands that the
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As a theory of liability for cost containment conduct, the
doctrine of respondeat superior might subject a third-party
payer to liability if a physician were employed by the managed
care product and the physician made negligent decisions based
on utilization review or financial risk shifting. Increasingly,
courts are applying theories of vicarious liability to third-party
payers. This is true where the managed care product limits a
patient's choice of providers to those who have contracted to
provide care to its beneficiaries.25 9
The doctrine presents several problems, however. First,
many managed care products, such as preferred provider orga-
nizations, do not directly employ physicians.26 0 Second, even
for employed physicians, many injury-producing decisions fall
within a gray area in which the decision, though motivated by
considerations other than the patient's best interests, is argua-
bly within the appropriate standard of care. Under such cir-
cumstances, third-party payers would escape liability for
resulting injuries. Furthermore, cost containment measures
move more physician conduct from the clearly negligent arena
into the nonnegligent (or judgment) arena, resulting in compen-
sation for fewer injured patients. Consequently, the doctrine of
respondeat superior would not be effective in spreading the cost
of cost containment injuries to all responsible parties.
D. Ostensible Agency Doctrine
Ostensible agency liability is a type of vicarious liability
under which a health care organization can be held liable for a
health care provider's negligence. 261 The liability of the organi-
independent relationship between the hospital and emergency room physician be
recognized." Id. at 871.
259. See, e.g., Schleier v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 876 F.2d 174, 177-78
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding an iMO vicariously liable for the negligence of a consulting
physician); Sloan v. Metro. Health Council, Inc., 516 N.E.2d 1104, 1109 (Ind. Ct. App.
1987) (holding that HlMOs can be liable for the conduct of employee physicians under
the doctrine of respondeat superior). But see Williams v. Good Health Plus, Inc., 743
S.W.2d 373 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (holding an HMO not liable for physicians found to be
independent contractors).
260. Mitts v. H.I.P., 478 N.Y.S.2d 910, 911 (App. Div. 1984) (rejecting the theory of
respondeat superior and finding in favor of a staff model IMO in a medical malpractice
suit on the grounds that the HMO "does not treat or render medical service or care to
anyone"). But c.f Schleier, 876 F.2d at 174 (holding an HMO responsible for the acts
and omissions of a consulting physician who had no contractual relationship to the
HMO).
261. Courts have used various labels to hold hospitals vicariously liable:
"ostensible" or "apparent" agency, or "agency by estoppel." Although the terms are often
1993]
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zation is based on appearances that have "led [a] patient to rea-
sonably believe that [the health care provider] was in [the
health care organization's] employ and under its control."262
Thus, reasonable reliance of the patient may determine liabil-
ity, even though no employment relationship exists.
In order to find a hospital liable for the negligent acts of an
independent physician with staff privileges, courts have gener-
ally required the following:
(1) The plaintiff must show that the hospital or its agent
acted in a way that would lead a reasonable person to
conclude that the negligent physician was operating as
an agent under the hospital's authority;
(2) Where the acts of the agent create the appearance of
authority, the plaintiff must prove that the hospital had
knowledge of and acquiesced in them; and
(3) The plaintiff must have acted in reliance on the ostensi-
ble agency relationship.26 3
used interchangeably, they are not theoretically identical. The ostensible or apparent
agency theory is based on § 429 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which provides as
follows:
One who employs an independent contractor to perform services for another
which are accepted in the reasonable belief that the services are being rendered
by the employer or by his servants, is subject to "liability for physical harm
caused by the negligence of the contractor in supplying such services, to the
same extent as though the employer were supplying them himself or by his
servants.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 429 (1965). In contrast, agency by estoppel is based
on § 267 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency, which provides as follows:
One who represents that another is his servant or other agent and thereby
causes a third person justifiably to rely upon the care or skill of such apparent
agent is subject to liability to the third person for harm caused by the lack of
care or skill of the one appearing to be a servant or other agent as if he were
such.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 267 (1958). Thus, § 429 of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts requires that the employer hold out the independent contractor as its own
employee, and that the injured person reasonably believe that the services are being
rendered by the employer or its agents. In contrast, § 267 of the Restatement (Second)
of Agency requires actual reliance on the representations of the employer by the injured
person. Some jurisdictions cite § 267, others cite § 429, and still others cite both.
262. Earlene P. Weiner, Note, Managed Health Care: HMO Corporate Liability,
Independent Contractors, and the Ostensible Agency Doctrine, 15 J. CORP. L. 535, 538
(1990).
263. See generally Grewe v. Mt. Clemens Gen. Hosp., 273 N.W.2d 429, 433-34
(Mich. 1978); Albain v. Flower Hosp., 553 N.E.2d 1038, 1048-49 (Ohio 1990); Capan v.
Divine Providence Hosp., 430 A.2d 647, 648 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (citing RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF TORTS § 429 (1965)); Brownsville Medical Ctr. v. Garcia, 704 S.W.2d 68, 74
(Tex. Ct. App. 1985).
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Thus, ostensible agency turns not on the issue of control, as
in the respondeat superior doctrine, but on the appearance of
the relationship between the physician and health care
institution.
Courts that have looked at this issue generally have
accepted the ostensible agency doctrine on two grounds. First,
the courts recognize that the changing role of the hospital in
society creates a likelihood that patients will look to the institu-
tion and not to the individual physician for care. 2 4 Second, the
courts say that ostensible agency liability should attach when
the hospital holds out 26 5 the physician as its employee.2 66
Will the ostensible agency doctrine be extended to third-
party payers? If applicable, will the doctrine be an effective tool
to promote safety, to protect the physician-patient relationship,
and to minimize access problems? The managed care product
market is changing radically and expanding rapidly.2 67 This
rapid change and expansion, coupled with an increase in the
number of inexperienced people who develop and manage man-
aged care products,2 8 would seem to create fertile ground for
litigation.269 The courts have heard several cases under the
doctrine of ostensible agency.270 The leading cases are Boyd v.
Albert Einstein Medical Center2 7 and Williams v. Good Health
Plus, Inc.272
264. See Grewe, 273 N.W.2d at 433.
265. A "holding out" occurs "when the hospital acts or omits to act in some way
which leads the patient to a reasonable belief he is being treated by the hospital by one
of its employees." Adamski v. Tacoma Gen. Hosp., 20 Wash. App. 98, 115, 579 P.2d 970,
979 (1978).
266. Howard v. Park, 195 N.W.2d 39, 40 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972); Capan, 430 A.2d at
649; Adamski, 20 Wash. App. at 115, 579 P.2d at 978-79; see also Brown v. Moore, 247
F.2d 711, 719-20 (3d Cir. 1957) (applying liability under respondeat superior when a
holding out occurs).
267. See generally Joanne Stern et al., Health Maintenance Organizations:
Development, Growth and Expansion, 8 WHITrIER L. REV. 377 (1986) (presenting a
panel discussion of the reasons behind the surge of HMOs in California).
268. Ossario, supra note 3, at 198.
269. Id. ("Just the fact that there are so many new HMOs and the fact that they are
expanding so rapidly creates tremendous problems.").
270. See, e.g., McClellan v. Health Maintenance Org., 604 A.2d 1053, 1058 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1992) (holding that an HMO's advertisements that it carefully screened its
primary care physicians subjected the HMO to the ostensible agency doctrine).
271. 547 A.2d 1229 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
272. 743 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
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1. Boyd v. Albert Einstein Medical Center
Mrs. Boyd died after being treated by physicians who were
participants in the "HMO of PA."273 In his lawsuit, Mr. Boyd
contended that the HMO advertised that its physicians and
medical care providers were competent and had been evaluated
for up to six months before being selected as HMO providers. 4
He further contended that he and Mrs. Boyd relied on the
HMO's representation of quality care in choosing Drs. Rosen-
thal and Dorstein as their primary care physicians, and that
HMO of PA's documents showed both that those doctors were
designated care providers and that HMO of PA guaranteed the
quality of care. 5
The trial court granted HMO of PA's motion for summary
judgment on the ground that Mr. Boyd failed to establish that
the theory of ostensible agency, based on the facts applied to
hospitals, applied to the HMO.27 6 On appeal, the Pennsylvania
Superior Court considered whether the theory of ostensible
273. Boyd, 547 A.2d at 1230. At the time of Mrs. Boyd's death, she and her
husband were participants in the Health Maintenance Organization of Pennsylvania
(HMO of PA), a managed care product. The third-party payer limited Mrs. Boyd's
choice of physician to the names provided in a directory. In June 1982, Mrs. Boyd saw
Dr. Rosenthal, whom she selected from the directory. Dr. Rosenthal referred Mrs. Boyd
to Dr. Erwin Cohen, a participating HMO of PA surgeon as required by the subscription
agreement. Dr. Cohen performed a biopsy of Mrs. Boyd's breast tissue on July 6, 1982.
During the surgery, he perforated Mrs. Boyd's chest wall with the biopsy needle. Mrs.
Boyd was discharged, but continued to have complaints for weeks afterward. On
August 19, Mrs. Boyd awoke with chest pain. Dr. Rosenthal examined Mrs. Boyd and
diagnosed Tietz's Syndrome. Tietz's Syndrome is an inflammatory condition affecting
the costochondral cartilage in women between 30 and 50 years old. He set up a
subsequent appointment for tests to be done at his office. Following a series of tests in
his office, Dr. Rosenthal sent Mrs. Boyd home. Her symptoms persisted and worsened.
That same afternoon, Mr. Boyd discovered Mrs. Boyd dead in their bathroom from a
heart attack. Id. at 1229-30.
In his lawsuit, Mr. Boyd contended that Mrs. Boyd exhibited symptoms of cardiac
distress and that Dr. Rosenthal should have sent her to the hospital rather than
negligently ordering the tests on Mrs. Boyd at his office. Id. at 1230 n.5. The reasons
the test occurred at Dr. Rosenthal's office were disputed. The HMO maintained that the
tests were done at Dr. Rosenthal's office because Mrs. Boyd would have been more
comfortable. Mr. Boyd maintained that they were done at the office because the HMO
required them to be done there to keep medical fees within the HMO. Id. at 1230 n.4.
Mr. Boyd contended that the safer practice would have been to perform the tests at the
hospital where the results would have been more quickly available and that this
negligent treatment caused Mrs. Boyd's death. Mr. Boyd maintained that HMO of PA
should be liable for the negligence of its participating physicians because those
physicians acted as ostensible agents for the HMO. Id. at 1231.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
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agency should be applied to an independent association practice
model HMO operating with independent contractor
physicians. 7
The Boyd court acknowledged that Pennsylvania recog-
nized the theory of ostensible agency and had applied it to hos-
pitals.2 7 It then outlined factors that other courts had
considered in determining that an independent contractor could
be an agent of a hospital.27 9 Among those factors were the like-
lihood that "patients will look to the institution rather than the
individual physician for care" and whether the HMO held out
the physician as an employee.28 °
Considering these factors, the Boyd court concluded that
ostensible agency should apply if Mrs. Boyd had submitted her-
self to the care or protection of the primary care physicians in
response to an invitation from the HMO. 281 The court decided
that there were grounds for an inference that the HMO
extended such an invitation to Mrs. Boyd.282 Furthermore, sev-
eral facts demonstrated that Mrs. Boyd reasonably could have
looked to the HMO for her medical care and that she reasonably
could have believed that the physician treating her was an
HMO of PA employee.28 3 HMO of PA's marketing materials
represented to enrollees that its program guaranteed the qual-
ity of care.28 4 It required enrollees to select a primary care phy-
sician from a limited list of physicians approved by the HMO.285
Finally, HMO of PA employed a gatekeeper system.2 8  The
court reasoned that "because [Mrs. Boyd] was required to follow
the mandates of HMO [of PA] and did not directly seek the
attention of the specialist, there is an inference that [she]
looked to the institution for care and not solely to the
physicians."28 7
277. Id. at 1234.
278. Id. at 1231.
279. Id. at 1232.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 1234-35.
282. Id. at 1235.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 1232 n.6 (noting that in a document entitled "Why Offer HMO-PA?,"
HMO of PA represented to employers that it "[assumes responsibility for quality and
accessibility" of health care).
285. Id. at 1235.
286. Id. at 1233; see supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
287. Boyd, 547 A.2d at 1235.
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The Boyd court concluded that "an issue of material fact
[existed] as to whether the participating physicians were the
ostensible agents of HMO [of PA]."28 8 Thus, the court reversed
the trial court's grant of summary judgment to HMO of PA and
remanded the ostensible agency question to the trial court.2 8 9
The court, however, did not decide whether Drs. Rosenthal and
Dornstein acted negligently nor whether HMO of PA would be
liable if they did.
2. Williams v. Good Health Plus
In Williams v. Good Health Plus, Inc. 290 Ruth Williams
maintained that her right thumbnail had to be surgically
removed after it became infected because of Good Health Plus's
and HealthAmerica's negligence. She claimed that the defend-
ants permitted unsanitary conditions to exist in the treatment
areas where the nail was treated, and that the defendants
placed her on a drug without previously performing necessary
tests.291
The Williams analysis (unlike Boyd) was based on state
laws governing the practice of medicine and governing HMOs.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. 743 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
291. Id. at 374. The Williamses provided the following statement of each act or
failure to act:
Failure to listen to patient complaints and failure to diagnose and properly
treat nail staph infections and systemic [lUupus (erythematosus], refusal of
treatment. Failure to order the usual and customary lab work for a person
taking the medications prescribed to monitor well[-]being of patient and to
decrease chance of side effects. Mismanagement of ca[rle of the nail to the
point that correct management of systemic lupus was impossible due to the fact
steroids could not be given appropriately.
Id. at 374-75. HealthAmerica Corporation (HealthAmerica) was the legal successor to
Good Health Plus, Inc. Southwest Medical Group (Southwest) was the physician group
that gave medical services to Mrs. Williams. The medical services agreement between
HealthAmerica and Southwest stated that "under this agreement, physicians 'shall be
totally responsible for all medical advice to and medical treatment of members and for
performance of medical services within the service area.'" Id. at 376. HealthAmerica
did not select the physicians who treated Mrs. Williams, and HealthAmerica did not
have the right to direct or control "the work or practice of medicine" of the physicians
who treated Mrs. Williams. Id. at 377. Neither HealthAmerica nor Good Health Plus
employed, paid, or supervised any physicians. In Mrs. Williams's medical records,
many progress notes were written on forms provided by Southwest and bore the profes-
sional association mark, "Southwest Medical Group, P.A." Id. at 378. Finally, when
Mrs. Williams sought care from the "Southwest Medical Group, P.A.," she signed a Con-
sent to Procedure form that contained the following language: "I hereby authorize [the
Southwest Group physician] and whomever he may designate as his assistants, to per-
form upon myself the following procedure ... ." Id.
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The Texas Medical Practice Act 292 prohibited the corporate
practice of medicine and required individuals to satisfy specific
licensure requirements to practice medicine. 293 The Act did not
provide any means for a corporation such as HealthAmerica to
be licensed to practice medicine.29 4
The Texas Health Maintenance Organization Act2 95 stated
that the Act shall not be construed to
(a) authorize any person, other than a duly licensed phy-
sician or practitioner of the healing arts, acting within the
scope of his or her license, to engage, directly or indirectly, in
the practice of medicine or any healing art, or
(b) authorize any person to regulate, interfere, or inter-
vene in any manner in the practice of medicine or any healing
art.296
292. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b, §§ 1.01-5.10 (West Supp. 1994).
293. Williams, 743 S.W.2d at 375. The provision provided as follows:
[I]t shall be unlawful for any individual, partnership, trust, association, or
corporation by the use of any letters, words, or terms as an affix on stationery
or on advertisements, or in any other manner, to indicate that the individual,
partnership, trust, association, or corporation is entitled to practice medicine if
the individual or entity is not licensed to do so.
Id. (quoting TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b, § 3.07(e) (West Supp. 1987)).
Under the corporate practice of medicine doctrine, a lay corporation cannot "employ
a doctor, charge for the doctor's services, pay the doctor a salary, and then keep the
profit that is left over." Anthony Hunter Schiff, Provider Discounts, 9 WHrIEa L. REv.
249, 250 (1987). A professional corporation owned by a physician is the only type of
corporate entity that can practice medicine and retain profits. Id. However, a corpora-
tion can provide health services to employees if it does not charge for the services. Id.
The corporate practice of medicine rule generally prohibits corporate entities from
employing physicians. The most significant exception to the rule is health maintenance
organizations. See Cynthia M. Combe & Neil Krugman, Design and Pricing of the PPO
and EPO Products, in MANAGED HEALTH CARE: LEGAL AND OPERATIONAL ISSUES FACING
PROVIDERS, INsuRERs, AND EMpLOYERs, at 114-16 (PLI Commercial Law and Practice
Course Handbook Series No. 393, 1986), available in WEsTLAw, TP-All File (discussing
the prohibitions against the corporate practice of medicine). This prohibition is based
on legal and policy considerations. Legally, statutory licensure requirements for physi-
cians include certain age, educational, and moral character requirements that are "inca-
pable of being met by an artificial [entity] such as a corporation." Id. at 114. Policy
considerations include a concern that corporations may control medical decision making
to "an unacceptable degree and interfere with the quality of patient care," and that
treatment decisions may be "based upon economic considerations, such as shareholder
interests, rather than upon patient need." id. at 114-15; see also CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE § 2400 (West 1990) (stating that "[c]orporations and other artificial legal entities
shall have no professional rights, privileges or powers").
294. See infra notes 295-298 and accompanying text.
295. TEx. INs. CODE ANN. §§ 20A.02-20A.36 (West 1990).
296. Williams, 743 S.W.2d at 375 (quoting TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 20A.29 (West
1981)).
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The Texas Health Maintenance Organization Act provided
that "[n]othing in this Act shall be construed as permitting the
practice of medicine as defined by the laws of this state."297
Perhaps most important was the provision of the Health Main-
tenance Organization Act that limited the powers of HMOs to
the following:
the furnishing of or arranging for medical care services only
through physicians or groups of physicians who have
independent contracts with the health maintenance organiza-
tions; the furnishing of or arranging for the delivery of health
care services only through providers or groups of providers
who are under contract with or employed by the health main-
tenance organization.298
Based on the court's interpretation of the relevant Texas
statutes and the facts, HealthAmerica established that, as a
matter of law, it was entitled to summary judgment.29 9 The
court reasoned that HealthAmerica could not be subjected to
liability for any of the alleged negligent treatment because
HealthAmerica could not practice medicine.3 0 0 The court gave
no credence to the argument that HealthAmerica represented
or held out the physicians as its agents °.3 0  The court did not
examine previous cases construing the ostensible agency theory
of liability.
3. Analysis of Boyd and Williams
While a third-party payer was liable in Boyd, but not in
Williams, Boyd and Williams are not inharmonious. Taken
together, the cases demonstrate why ostensible agency, though
theoretically applicable to third parties, is a weak doctrine.
First, the applicability of the doctrine relies on facts within the
third-party payer's control that can be easily manipulated.
Boyd and Williams were decided under very different factual
circumstances. For instance, in Boyd, HMO of PA was more
involved in medical decision making, while the third-party
payer in Williams exercised very little specific direction and
297. Id. (quoting TEx. INs. CoDE ANN. § 20A.06(aX3) (West 1981) (alteration in
original)).
298. Id.
299. Id. at 379.
300. Id. at 378.
301. Id.
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control over the physicians who treated the plaintiff.3" 2 Fur-
thermore, the Williams court did not rule out the possibility
that under the right fact pattern, it might apply the ostensible
agency analysis. If true, the alleged acts and omissions of mis-
diagnosis and medical mistreatment would mean that
HealthAmerica engaged in the practice of medicine.30 3
HealthAmerica submitted a motion for summary judgment and
affidavits establishing that, as a matter of law, HealthAmerica
could not practice medicine. When Williams did not respond
with additional facts that would establish ostensible agency,304
the court held that she was "not entitled to claim, in the absence
of a response to the motion for summary judgment or any other
evidence in the record, that HealthAmerica may be liable on
some theory of holding-out or ostensible agency."3 05 Thus, it is
likely that given the right facts (and possibly better lawyering),
Texas, like Pennsylvania, will apply the ostensible agency
doctrine.
Even if applied, however, the doctrine is flawed in its
capacity to promote safety, to spread risk, and to minimize the
negative effects of cost containment efforts. Because of the
holding out requirement, third-party payers can easily restruc-
ture their programs to avoid the appearance of agency.30 6 The
key factor underlying Boyd was that Mrs. Boyd looked to the
HMO corporate institution, not to the individual physicians.30 7
A well-developed managed care product and a skilled attorney
could remove such appearances. For example, how would the
Boyd case have turned out if HMO of PA had not promised any
quality of care, had given Mrs. Boyd the option of seeking care
outside the plan,30  and had required a disclosure consent
acknowledging that the physicians were independent contrac-
tors3 °9 and not agents of the plan?31 0
302. It is unclear, however, from the facts of Williams whether Mrs. Williams
selected Southwest's doctors or was required to use them. Part of the problem with
Williams may be in how the plaintiff's attorney formed the case.
303. Id. at 375-76.
304. Id. at 378.
305. Id. at 379.
306. See Gnessin, supra note 132, at 410 (advising managed care organizations to
inform and to disclose to the patient the exact relationship between the health care
provider and the HMO as an effective defense against ostensible agency).
307. Boyd v. Albert Einstein Medical Ctr., 547 A.2d 1229, 1235 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1988).
308. See id. (indicating that Mrs. Boyd had no choice as to which specialist to use).
309. "A hospital would not be held liable for the negligence of a doctor (whether on
staff or not) if the patient was aware of the actual relationship between the doctor and
1993]
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Second, the effectiveness of the ostensible agency doctrine
can be statutorily negated, as it was in Texas. The court in Wil-
liams relied on Texas law that provided that HMOs are not
exempt from the corporate practice of medicine rule. That law
is unique among laws governing HMOs. Most other states offer
HMOs an exemption from the prohibition against the corporate
practice of medicine.311 Thus, courts in most other jurisdictions
will make a common law negligence analysis or an ostensible
agency analysis and not a statutory analysis.312 Still, the issue
of HMO liability is new, so future decisions are not clearly
predictable.
Finally, the ostensible agency doctrine is applicable only to
some forms of managed care products.3 13 It is, for example,
inapplicable to managed care products that hire staff physi-
cians.34 More importantly, the doctrine of ostensible agency is
the hospital." Stewart v. Midani, 525 F. Supp. 843, 853 (N.D. Ga. 1981); see also
Hannola v. City of Lakewood, 426 N.E.2d 1187, 1190 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980) (holding that
public advertisements disclaiming agency may serve to insulate the unwilling
principals).
310. A court could find that even where an individual knew that the managed care
organization (MCO) physicians were independent contractors, and not MCO employees,
an individual requiring care lacks a meaningful choice because of the financial
restraints placed on individuals who opt out of the MCO plan. Under those restraints
the court might find ostensible agency despite the knowledge of the individual. See
Martell v. St. Charles Hosp., 523 N.Y.S.2d 342, 351 (Sup. Ct. 1987) (holding that even
where a patient has the knowledge of emergency room physicians' status as
independent contractors, the hospital can be held liable under ostensible agency
theory).
311. See Pamela S. Bouey & Maureen E. Corcoran, Managed Care Diversification
and New Products, in MANAGED HEALTH CARE 1988: LEGAL AND OPERATIONAL ISSUES, at
9, 13 (PLI Commercial Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 471, 1988),
available in WEsTIAw, TP-All File (stating that most states exempt HMOs from
prohibitions regarding the practice of medicine by lay corporations). But see ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 215, para. 165/26 (1993) (HMOs cannot be found liable for the malpractice of
member physicians); Brown v. Michael Reese Health Plan, Inc., 502 N.E.2d 433 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1986) (holding that a statute exempting voluntary health service plans from
liability was a reasonable exercise of state power and a justifiable method of pursuing
cost control).
312. Cf Schleier v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 876 F.2d 174, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(holding an HIMO liable for the negligence of an independent contractor where sufficient
evidence of a master-servant relationship existed).
313. The diverse organizational structures make the application of traditional
malpractice theories more difficult. See generally Gregory G. Binford, Malpractice and
the Prepaid Health Care Organization, 3 WHIrrIER L. REv. 337 (1981); Monahan &
Willis, supra note 79, at 353; Oakley & Kelley, supra note 228, at 624.
314. See Ossario, supra note 3, at 197-98 (distinguishing IPA for-profit HMOs from
nonprofit group staff models of the past decade by noting the difference in management
controls and financial incentive arrangements). In Boyd, the defendant HMO was an
independent practice association model HMO. Boyd v. Albert Einstein Medical Ctr.,
547 A.2d 1229, 1232-33 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
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applicable only when physician negligence exists. Because cost
containment activities are not considered when determining lia-
bility, there is little incentive for third-party payers to change
cost containment activities that result in injuries. Under the
ostensible agency doctrine, a court will view physician malprac-
tice as an aberration, not as a symptom indicating a need for
systemic change. Furthermore, because not all persons injured
by defective cost containment measures can establish ostensible
agency, the doctrine is ineffective as a risk spreader.
E. Summary
The tort system has developed several theories to facilitate
compensation for injuries caused by another. Negligence will
compensate for behavior that falls below a standard of reason-
able care. Corporate negligence will hold an organization liable
for the negligent conduct of a provider when the organization
was negligent in hiring or supervising the provider. Respondeat
superior will hold an employer liable for the negligent acts of an
employee provider even though the employer itself has not
acted negligently. Ostensible agency will hold an organization
liable for the negligent act of a provider who, even though not
an employee, has been held out as an agent of the organization.
As discussed, negligence, corporate negligence, respondeat
superior, and ostensible agency are all inadequate to meet the
goals of compensating victims, promoting safety, and spreading
the risk. These theories fail to include injuries created by man-
aged care organizations in their cost containment efforts of util-
ization review and financial risk shifting. To meet these goals,
an alternative compensation system must be developed. This is
particularly crucial because even if a patient proves a tort claim
for injuries, ERISA would raise an additional barrier to
recovery.
V. ERISA AS A BARRIER TO COMPENSATION FOR INJURIES
The most significant barrier to recovery for injuries caused
by cost containment activities may be the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).315
315. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
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A Background
ERISA was enacted by Congress in 1974 to bring uniform-
ity to the state laws governing private pension and benefit
plans.3 16 ERISA establishes minimum standards regulating
the content of pension plans with respect to participation, bene-
fit accrual, vesting, benefit payment, fiduciary status and con-
duct, reporting and disclosure, and funding.s17 In addition,
ERISA requires nonpension employee benefit plans (e.g.,
employer provided health insurance) to comply with ERISA's
fiduciary, reporting, and disclosure requirements. 18 Finally,
ERISA empowers participants, beneficiaries, and fiduciaries to
initiate civil actions in federal court to enforce the requirements
of ERISA or to enforce the terms of a pension or welfare plan.3 19
While states enjoy concurrent jurisdiction in actions to enforce
the terms of a plan, in all other actions the federal courts have
exclusive jurisdiction.3 20 The principal purpose of ERISA was
"to protect... the interests of participants in employee benefit
plans ...by establishing standards of conduct, responsibility,
and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by
providing for appropriate remedies.., and ready access to the
Federal courts."3 2'
ERISA also contains an explicit preemption clause, which
provides that ERISA supersedes all state laws that apply to
employee benefit plans.322 Notwithstanding several exemp-
316. SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUB. WELFARE, RETnIEmENT INCOME SECURrrY
FOR EMPLOYEES ACT OF 1973, S. REP. No. 127, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1973).
317. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1145 (1988).
318. Id.
319. Id. § 1132.
320. Id. § 1132(eX).
321. Id. § 1001(b). Before 1974, there was no comprehensive body of law governing
the administration and regulation of employee benefit plans. At the federal level,
employee benefit plans were regulated through the Internal Revenue Code and § 302 of
the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1988). In 1958, the Welfare and Pension Plan
Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 85-836, 72 Stat. 997 (1958) (repealed 1976), required certain
reports and disclosure. However, the states exercised their authority through
inconsistent doctrines of state trust, insurance, and contract law. Daniel W. Sherrick,
ERISA Preemption: An Introduction, 64 MIcH. B.J. 1074, 1074 (1985), available in
WzEsmLw, TP-AIl File.
322. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988). State law includes "all laws, decisions, rules,
regulations, or other State action having the effect of law." Id. § 1144(c)(1). A state
includes "political subdivisions ..., or any agency or instrumentality... which purports
to regulate directly or indirectly the terms and conditions of employee benefit plans."
Id. § 1144(c)(2). Furthermore, ERISA exempts certain state laws from preemption (i.e.,
acts or omissions occurring after January 1, 1975): (1) laws that regulate insurance,
banking, or securities; (2) criminal laws of general applicability; (3) any law of the
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tions, the Supreme Court has held that the clause is to be con-
strued broadly.3 23  In particular, preemption is extended to
state laws whenever they have a connection with or reference to
an employee benefit plan.3 24
Where there has been a violation of ERISA, the beneficiary
is ordinarily entitled to recover only contractual damages. 25
ERISA, however, provides for "other appropriate equitable
relief':
(a) A civil action may be brought... (3) by a participant, ben-
eficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which
violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the
plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to
redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this
subchapter or the terms of the plan ....
Nevertheless, whether extracontractual or punitive damages
are available to a beneficiary under ERISA is still an open ques-
tion.32 7  Consequently, without extracontractual or punitive
damages, a plaintiff injured by a utilization review activity
through the denial of services can recover only contract dam-
ages-the cost of the denied service or substituted services.
United States; and (4) public employer plans, church plans, and workers compensation
plans. Id. § 1144(a)-(d). Thus, without an explicit exemption, ERISA applies to any
state law that regulates medical benefit plans.
323. FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 58 (1990) (noting that "[t]he preemption
clause is conspicuous for its breadth"); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 46
(1987) ("deliberately expansive").
324. See generally Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 133 (1990)
(cause of action allowing recovery from employer when discharge is premised on an
attempt to avoid contributing to pension plan is preempted); Mackey v. Lanier
Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 829-30 (1988) (statute explicitly barring
garnishment of ERISA plan funds is preempted); Dedeaux, 481 U.S. at 47-48 (common
law tort and contract causes of action seeking damages for improper processing of a
claim for benefits under a disability plan are preempted); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,
463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983) (statute interpreted by state court as prohibiting plans from
discriminating on the basis of pregnancy is preempted); Christopher v. Mobil Oil Corp.,
950 F.2d 1209, 1218 (5th Cir.) (common law fraud and negligent misrepresentation
claims that allege reliance on agreements or representations about the coverage of a
plan are preempted), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 68 (1992).
325. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(aXIXB) (1988); see, e.g., Cathey v. Dow Chemical Co. Medical
Care Program, 907 F.2d 554, 555 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1087 (1991).
326. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(aX3) (1988).
327. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985). A number of
circuits have adopted the view that no money damages would be awardable. See Harsch
v. Eisenberg, 956 F.2d 651 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 61 (1992); Novak v.
Andersen Corp., 962 F.2d 757 (8th Cir. 1992); Drinkwater v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
846 F.2d 821 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 909 (1988); Bishop v. Osborn Transp., Inc.,
838 F.2d 1173 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 832 (1988); Sokol v. Bernstein, 803
F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1986).
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B. Corcoran v. United HealthCare
Although the concept of imposing liability on third-party
payers for utilization review activities and financial risk shift-
ing is only beginning to be explored, 328 Corcoran v. United
HealthCare, Inc.329 raised the issue of the limitations imposed
by ERISA on claims against third-party payers and utilization
review organizations.
Mrs. Florence Corcoran was a long-time employee of South
Central Bell Telephone Company (Bell). Mrs. Corcoran was a
member of Bell's Medical Assistance Plan (MAP). 330
She became pregnant in early 1989.33 1 This was Mrs. Cor-
coran's second pregnancy and, like the first pregnancy, several
medical problems made the pregnancy high risk. Late in the
pregnancy, her obstetrician recommended that she have com-
plete bed rest during the final months of her pregnancy. As in
the first pregnancy,3 32 he recommended that Mrs. Corcoran be
hospitalized so that the condition of the fetus could be moni-
tored twenty-four hours a day.333
In accordance with MAP's requirements, 3 4 Mrs. Corcoran
applied to Bell for temporary disability benefits for the remain-
der of her pregnancy.3 5 Based on a utilization review per-
formed by United Healthcare (United), Bell denied the
disability benefits. Her obstetrician wrote Bell explaining Mrs.
Corcoran's medical condition. Nevertheless, Bell denied the dis-
ability benefit a second time, even though a second opinion
solicited by Bell suggested that "the company would be at con-
siderable risk denying her doctor's recommendation." 336
Despite the obstetrician's recommendation, United decided that
328. See supra part IV.
329. 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 812 (1992).
330. Id. at 1322, 1323. MAP was a self-funded medical benefits plan. The plan was
administered by Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama (Blue Cross) pursuant to an
Administrative Services Agreement between Bell and Blue Cross. Id.
331. Id. at 1322.
332. In the first pregnancy, the fetus went into distress at the 36th week. The
obstetrician had to perform a Cesarean section to successfully deliver the baby. Id. at
1323.
333. Id. at 1322-23.
334. Under the portion of MAP known as the "Quality Care Program" (QCP),
participants were required to obtain precertification for overnight hospital admissions,
and concurrent review or approval once they were admitted to a hospital. Failure of the
plan's participants to obtain approval would affect the benefits to which they were
otherwise entitled. Id. at 1323.
335. Id. at 1322.
336. Id.
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hospitalization was not necessary and ten hours per day of
home health care would suffice. During the time when the
home health nurse was not on duty, the fetus went into distress
and died. 37
Mrs. Corcoran and her husband filed a state action alleging
various claims, including wrongful death; the lost love, society,
and affection of their unborn child; aggravation of a preexisting
depressive condition; and the loss of consortium caused by that
aggravation. 338 The defendants removed the action to federal
court on the ground that it was preempted by ERISA.339 They
then moved for summary judgment. The defendants character-
ized the relationship between them and Mrs. Corcoran as
existing solely as a result of an ERISA plan.340 According to the
defendants, the plaintiffs' cause of action was one of "improper
handling of a claim" and therefore the claims were preempted
by statute.341 The plaintiff, on the other hand, argued that (1)
the case boiled down to one for malpractice against United
HealthCare, (2) the claims pertained to state law of general
application, and (3) preemption would leave them without a
remedy and thus contravene the purpose of ERISA.342
The district court granted the defendants' motion.343
According to the district court, the plaintiffs' state law claim
related to the employee benefit plan because "[b]ut for the
ERISA plan, the defendants would have played no role in Mrs.
Corcoran's pregnancy."344 On a motion for reconsideration, the
plaintiffs did not ask the district court to reconsider its preemp-
tion ruling. Instead, they contended that the compensatory
damages that they sought were within the civil enforcement
mechanisms of ERISA as "other appropriate equitable relief."345
Ignoring authority to the contrary, 46 the district court denied
the motion, indicating that "[t]he vast majority of federal appel-
337. Id.
338. Id. at 1324.
339. Id. at 1325; see also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 66 (1987)
(holding that ERISA preemption is so exhaustive that a preemption defense provides an
adequate basis for removal to federal court).
340. All parties agreed that the plan was governed by ERISA. Corcoran, 965 F.2d
at 1325.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id. at 1325-26.
346. E.g., Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985);
Lorenzen v. Employees Retirement Plan of Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 896 F.2d 228, 230
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late courts have ... held that a beneficiary under an ERISA
health plan may not recover under... ERISA compensatory or
consequential damages for emotional distress or other claims
beyond medical expenses covered by the plan."347
On appeal, United argued that preemption applied because
the decision it made was a health benefit decision made in its
capacity as a plan fiduciary.34 All it did, it argued, was to
determine whether Mrs. Corcoran qualified for the benefits.
Consequently, the plaintiffs could not sue in tort to remedy
injuries caused by plan benefit decisions.349 The Corcorans
argued that preemption did not apply because United's decision
was not an erroneous claims decision but an erroneous medical
decision.3 50 Thus, their medical negligence claim was not pre-
empted.351 The appeals court could not "fully agree with either
United or the Corcorans":352
Ultimately, we conclude that United makes medical deci-
sions- indeed, United gives medical advice-but it does so in
the context of making a determination about the availability
of benefits under the plan. Accordingly, we hold that the Lou-
isiana tort action asserted by the Corcorans for the wrongful
death of their child allegedly resulting from United's errone-
ous medical decision is preempted by ERISA. 353
Finally, the court rejected an award of extracontractual
damages under section 502(a)(3) of ERISA.354 Noting that the
Corcorans proved neither a violation of the substantive provi-
sions of ERISA nor a violation of the terms of the plan, the court
(7th Cir. 1990); Warren v. Society Natl Bank, 905 F.2d 975 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 2256 (1991).
347. Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1326 (quoting Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc., Civ.
A. No. 90-4303, 1991 WL 353841, at *1 (E.D. La. Apr. 3, 1991)); see also Settles v.
Golden Rule Ins. Co., 927 F.2d 505, 570 (10th Cir. 1991); McRae v. Seafarers' Welfare
Plan, 920 F.2d 819, 821-22 n.8 (11th Cir. 1991); Cefalu v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 871 F.2d
1290, 1297 (5th Cir. 1989); Sommers Drug Stores Co. Employee Profit Sharing Trust v.
Corrigan Enters., Inc., 793 F.2d 1456, 1462-64 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1034, and cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1089 (1987).
348. Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1329.
349. Id. at 1330. See generally Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47-48
(1987). See also William A. Chittenden III, Malpractice Liability and Managed Health
Care: History and Prognosis, 26 TORT & INs. L.J. 451, 489 (1991) (stating that claims of
negligence for injuries caused by utilization review denial of medical services "can... be
characterized as claims founded upon a constructive denial of plan benefits").
350. Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1330.
351. Id. See generally Sommers Drug Stores, 793 F.2d at 1456.
352. Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1331.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 1337.
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went on to determine that damages for emotional distress and
loss of consortium were simply not available.355
Given the fundamental differences between prospective
and retrospective utilization review decisions on access to
care,35 the court had no difficulty characterizing United's
refusal to approve hospitalization as the provision of medical
services.3 57 Nor did it accept United's argument that it specifi-
cally told beneficiaries that medical decisions were ultimately
up to the "beneficiary and his or her doctor."358 Nevertheless,
the court viewed United's medical decisions as "part and parcel
of its mandate to decide what benefits are available under the
Bell plan."3 59  The court recognized that when a utilization
review agency or a third-party payer makes a decision, it does
so because of the financial ramifications.3 60
Despite this view, the court reasoned that finding that the
patient's claim was not preempted would undermine the goals
of ERISA.36 ' If utilization review activities were not pre-
empted, state courts might develop different substantive stan-
dards applicable to the same conduct. 362 Plans and conduct
would then necessarily be tailored to the law of each jurisdic-
tion.363 Furthermore, without preemption, there is a signifi-
cant risk that state liability rules would be applied differently
to the same conduct of the same third-party payer with man-
aged care products in different states.3 64 The court maintained
that
355. Id. at 1335.
356. See supra notes 177-183 and accompanying text.
357. The court relied on the QCP booklet for "substantial support" for its view that
the refusal was a medical decision. United's booklet says that it "assess[es] the need for
surgery or hospitalization and determine[s] the appropriate length of stay for a
hospitalization, based on nationally accepted medical guidelines." Corcoran, 965 F.2d
at 1331. The booklet goes on to say that United "will discuss with your doctor the
appropriateness of the treatments recommended and the availability of alternative
types of treatments." Id. The booklet emphasizes that "United's staff includes doctors,
nurses, and other medical professionals knowledgeable about the health care delivery
system. Together with your doctor, they work to assure that you and your covered
family members receive the most appropriate medical care." Id.
358. Id. According to the court, the disclaimer only supports the conclusion that no
physician-patient relationship existed between United and Corcoran. Id; see also
Wickline v. California, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810, 819 (Ct. App. 1986) (declining to hold Medi-
Cal liable but recognizing that it made a medical judgment).
359. Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1332.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 1333.
364. Id.
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the cost of complying with varying substantive standards
would increase the cost of providing utilization review serv-
ices, thereby increasing the cost to health benefit plans of
including cost containment features such as the Quality Care
program (or causing them to eliminate this sort of cost con-
tainment program altogether) and ultimately decreasing the
pool of plan funds available to reimburse participants. 365
The court ignored the argument that failure to impose lia-
bility on utilization review activities might actually increase the
number of poor-quality medical decisions and medical inju-
ries.366 Rather, as noted by one author, the court seemed to
imply that because imposing liability would have only a mild
"salutary effect of deterring poor-quality medical decisions,"
declining to impose liability would not be grave error.36 7 Nor
did the lack of a remedy under ERISA's civil enforcement
scheme for medical malpractice committed in connection with a
third-party payer's utilization review decision affect the
court. 368 The court ignored the fact that Congress implemented
a comprehensive statute in a time when it could not have pre-
dicted the medical utilization review process and could not have
contemplated that employee benefit plans would actually make
medical decisions contrary to physicians' recommended treat-
ment.369 The court also rejected the argument that preemption
was inappropriate because a medical malpractice claim is an"exercise of traditional state authority rather than an area not
traditionally regulated by the states."37 °
The court acknowledged that "fundamental changes such
as the widespread institution of utilization review would seem
to warrant a reevaluation of ERISA so that it can continue to
serve its noble purpose of safeguarding the interests of employ-
365. Id.
366. Id. at 1332-33.
367. See Leslie C. Giordani, Comment, A Cost Containment Malpractice Defense:
Implications for the Standard of Care and for Indigent Patients, 26 Hous. L. Rav. 1007,
1021 (1989).
368. Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1333; see also Memorial Hosp. Systems v. Northbrook
Life Ins. Co., 904 F.2d 236,248 n.16 (5th Cir. 1990); Lee v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours, 894
F.2d 755, 757 (5th Cir. 1990).
369. Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1334.
370. Id.; see Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990) (wrongful
discharge action preempted); Christopher v. Mobil Oil Corp., 950 F.2d 1208, 1218 (5th
Cir.) (fraud action preempted), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 68 (1992); Sommers Drug Stores
Co. Employee Profit Sharing Trust v. Corrigan Enters., Inc., 793 F.2d 1456, 1467 (5th
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1034, and cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1089 (1987).
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ees."371 However, it rejected the notion that it had any ability to
make such changes. "Our system, of course, allocates this task
to Congress, not the courts, and we acknowledge our role today
by interpreting ERISA in a manner consistent with the
expressed intentions of its creators."3 72
ERISA preemption and the lack of extracontractual dam-
ages mean that individuals injured by third-party payers' utili-
zation review activities have no remedy, state or federal.373
With no common law liability and no extracontractual damages,
there is little pressure on third-party payers to avoid substan-
dard medical decision making.374
VI. THE MEDICAL INJURY COMPENSATION FuND-A PROPOSAL
The goals of the current tort system vis 6 vis medical mal-
practice are to compensate victims, deter substandard medical
care, and spread the cost of injuries.375 It is questionable
whether the tort system meets these goals for existing medical
injuries. It is even more debatable whether the tort system can
meet these goals for managed care. As an alternative, this Arti-
cle proposes a medical injury compensation fund system that
will meet the goals that the tort system fails to meet. In addi-
tion, the proposed fund system provides an effective way to
spread the costs of medical care.
This Part begins by summarizing the problems with the
current tort system in Section A. Then, in Section B, the ele-
ments of the alternative medical injury compensation fund are
set out. Section C addresses the limitations and problems
inherent in implementing a fund system like the one proposed.
Section D, on the other hand, outlines the important benefits
that would be provided by the proposed fund.
A. Problems with the Tort System
The tort system results in a significant degree of chance,
heavy transactional costs, inadequate compensation recovery,
enormous malpractice premiums, and ineffectual deterrents. A
significant element of chance exists under the tort system.
371. Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1338-39.
372. Id.
373. Id. at 1338.
374. Id.
375. David S. Starr, The No-Fault Alternative to Medical Malpractice Litigation:
Compensation, Deterrence, and Viability Aspects of a Patient Compensation Scheme, 20
TEX. TECH L. Rav. 803, 806 (1989).
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Recovery is speculative and has been equated to a lottery.376
Even though seventeen percent of adverse outcomes in medical
patients are traceable to negligence,377 under the current tort
recovery system only ten percent of injured patients eventually
file a claim, and only four percent actually receive compensa-
tion.378 The persons least likely to receive compensation are
likely to be those least able to afford the injuries: the poor,
women, and minorities. These groups have historically had
inadequate access to the legal system, clearly affecting their
ability to recover for cost containment injuries.
The tort system imposes heavy transactional costs. Even
for those who actually receive compensation, the transactional
costs created by the process are immense. Plaintiffs incur sig-
nificant costs in time, money, and stress.379 The average medi-
cal malpractice claim takes over eighteen months to settle or
adjudicate.38 0 Much of this time is attributable to delay as a
defense maneuver.38 l The costs of litigating malpractice claims
are significant,38 2 and the psychological stress is real.38 3
The tort system provides inadequate recovery. Even after
investing the time, money, and stress, the plaintiffs recovery is
still likely to be inadequate to compensate her economic losses.
In fact, up to forty percent of any award goes to attorney fees.38 4
Thus, even if a patient overcomes the difficulty of recovering
under the tort system and gets past the barrier of ERISA, com-
pensation is likely to be inadequate.
The tort system breeds enormous malpractice premiums.
Despite meager overall compensation, the extraordinary size of
some tort recoveries has allowed insurance companies and
others to create the impression of a medical malpractice crisis.
This perception has allowed malpractice insurers to raise pre-
miums astronomically.38 5 For example, high-risk specialists
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. Tan, supra note 186, at 243 n.13.
381. Starr, supra note 375, at 806-07 n.23.
382. Murray L. Schwartz & Daniel J.B. Mitchell, An Economic Analysis of the
Contingent Fee in Personal Litigation, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1125 (1970) (noting that the
greatest expense for the plaintiff is the contingent fee).
383. Starr, supra note 375, at 806-07 n.23.
384. Id.
385. Stephen D. Sugarman, Doctor No, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 1499 (1991) (reviewing
PAUL C. WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL (1991)).
[Vol. 17:1
1993] Compensating for Health Care Injuries 75
such as neurosurgeons and obstetricians in high-risk states
such as New York and Florida pay annual medical malpractice
insurance premiums of $100,000 to $200,000.36 During three
years in the 1980s, total medical malpractice premiums
skyrocketed from $2 billion to more than $5 billion.38 7 It is
important to keep this in perspective: The average physician
pays medical malpractice premiums of only $16,000.318 Never-
theless, the overall increase in expenditures for malpractice
insurance translates into increases in the cost of health care for
everyone.
The tort system provides ineffectual deterrents. Whether
the tort system deters substandard care is, at best, specula-
tive.389 The question is whether third-party payers will alter
their behavior to conform to the legal standard for cost contain-
ment activities indicated by tort recovery. For instance, testing
for glaucoma in persons under the age of forty was once seen as
medically unnecessary because of the infrequency of the condi-
tion in that age group. But after Gates v. Jensen,390 physicians
may have begun to test persons under forty more frequently as
a form of defensive medicine-they test to avoid liability, not to
diagnose a specific condition. Third-party payers would not
necessarily react in the same way. They could view the court as
wrong and not conform their behavior, or they could simply
ignore the court altogether, confident that traditional liability
theories would not reach them. After all, only theoretical pos-
sibilities have been articulated, and no real and substantial
deterrent effect has been proved.39 '
Consequently, whether viewed from the perspective of the
nonrecovering patient, the premium-paying physician, or the
damages-paying third-party payer, the present system is inade-
quate to handle the task of fairly distributing the cost of inju-
ries. In addition to fairness problems, the present system
exacerbates the cost of medical injuries through transactional
costs, social costs of delay and disability, individual costs of
fearful practitioners, and what may be developing as a systemic
cost of defensive medical practice.
386. Id.
387. 1 AMmCRi LAW INsTrrrrE, REPORTER'S STuDY, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY
FOR PERSONAL INJURY 3 (1991).
388. Sugarman, supra note 385, at 1499.
389. Starr, supra note 375, at 807-08.
390. 92 Wash. 2d 246, 595 P.2d 919 (1979).
391. See Starr, supra note 375, at 808.
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These problems are based on the preexisting system of
health care delivery, which was based on the singular relation-
ship between provider and patient. The new relationship
between third-party payers and providers, developed through
the introduction of managed care, will result in additional and
new kinds of injuries to encumber and tax an already
overburdened system. Because managed-care injuries have
such difficult problems of proof and are so indirect in causation,
those injuries widen the gap between injury and compensation.
For these reasons, it would be wise to consider some alternative
to the present tort system to allocate the burden for injuries.
B. Elements of a Medical Injury Compensation Fund
This Article proposes, in general terms, an alternative sys-
tem of medical injury compensation analogous to the widely
accepted workers' compensation system.3 92 Workers' compen-
sation systems are based on the premise that injuries arising
out of, and in the course of, one's employment should constitute
an expense of doing business and that, therefore, the level of
fault is irrelevant in most circumstances.393 Recovery for one's
injury is certain, and proof problems are limited. 94 On the
other hand, the amount of recovery is less than full. 395 The
injured employee's medical expenses are fully covered, 96 her
rehabilitation expenses are usually fully covered,397 and her
loss of earning capacity recovery is limited.398  Thus, the
amount of money received by the injured employee does not
make the employee whole.3 99 However, because the transac-
tional costs to the injured employee are minimal, the employee
may, in real dollars, recover at about the same level as if the
employee went to trial. The objectives of the system are to get
392. The suggestion of a no-fault compensation plan is not new; it has been
proposed by a number of scholars. See, e.g., David G. Duff, Compensation For
Neurologically Impaired Infants: Medical No-Fault in Virginia, 27 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
391, 391 (1990); Jeffrey O'Connell, A Neo No-Fault' Contract in Lieu of Tort:
Preaccident Guarantees of Postaccident Settlement Offers, 73 CAL. L. REv. 898 (1985);
Stephen D. Sugarman, Alternative Compensation Schemes and Tort Theory Doing Away
With Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REv. 558 (1985).
393. 1 ARTHUR LAmSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATON § 1.1 (1992).
394. 1 id. § 1.10.
395. 1 id. § 2.50.
396. 2 id. § 61.00.
397. 2 id. § 61.21.
398. 2 id. § 60.00.
399. 1 id. § 2.50.
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the employee back on the job and to induce employers to avoid
on the job injury.
Like workers' compensation, the medical injury compensa-
tion fund would compensate quickly, correctly, and without
regard to fault. An effective compensation scheme will deal
with several issues: defining the compensable injury, determin-
ing the amount of compensation, financing the scheme, notify-
ing the public of the existence of the fund and the performance
of providers, defining exemptions, and covering legal fees for
denied claims.
1. Defining Compensable Medical Injuries
The primary focus of the compensation fund would be on
whether the patient incurred a medical injury. The fund would
compensate for injuries arising out of, and in the course of,
health care treatment. While the well-developed case law inter-
preting the workers' compensation requirements could be used
by analogy, there are unique definitional problems, the most
significant of which is defining "medical injury" itself. Cer-
tainly not all consequences to a patient should be covered. In
particular, those physical conditions that are the natural conse-
quences of disease or the aging process would not be covered.
Essentially, compensable medical injuries would be com-
posed of four categories: treatment injuries, drug injuries, cost
containment injuries, and informed consent injuries. For exam-
ple, in the area of drug therapy, treatment injuries would con-
sist of injuries caused by giving the patient the wrong
medication or the wrong dosage of medication, or by failing to
give needed medication. Drug injuries would be caused by an
injurious reaction to an otherwise appropriately prescribed
drug. Cost containment injuries would be caused by the refusal
of the third-party payer to authorize payment for an essential
and expensive drug. Informed consent injuries would result
from the failure to inform the patient of the probable side effects
of an otherwise appropriately prescribed drug.
Because the possibilities of fraud in connection with claims
of failure to inform are so great, it is proposed that these claims
be left to the existing tort system.40 0 To include these claims in
the compensation system would be inappropriate because the
claims are peculiarly tied to conduct rather than status or cir-
400. A patient may typically say, "You may have told me but I obviously did not
understand because I consented to the treatment, so my consent was not informed."
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cumstances. The focus for questions of causation in the other
three categories is on the source of injury, as in a workers' com-
pensation system, and not on the conduct of the actor.
Another problem is defining the point at which subsequent
injuries become so attenuated that they should not be covered
by the system. As in workers' compensation, a medical injury
could result from a previous medical injury or from complica-
tions of an initial condition.
As noted, a medical injury compensation fund will have dif-
ficulty defining an injury. Unlike the tort system, however,
problems of proof of causation are almost nonexistent. A person
wishing to recover from the medical injury compensation fund
will only have to prove that (1) there was a medical injury and
(2) the injury occurred in the course of medical services.
2. Compensation
Compensation would be limited but adequate to meet the
patient's economic need, which is not necessarily the same as
her economic loss. While limited recovery is a necessary part of
a compensation scheme, recovery should not be so limited that
it fails to act as a deterrent to unsafe medical and managed care
practice or causes an economic hardship to the injured patient.
To meet these requirements, the fund would compensate for
medical expenses, 401 economic expenses,40 2 and disabling pain
and suffering.40 3
3. Financing the Fund
The fund would be financed by premium payments from all
health care providers, health care institutions, and managed
care organizations. All health care providers (e.g., physicians,
hospitals, nurses, nursing homes, laboratories) licensed by a
state to provide any kind of health care services would pay into
the fund. The providers' payments could be based on a set pre-
mium or on a percentage of gross income from providing health
care services.
401. A provider and a patient may agree, however, that the injuring provider may
provide continued medical care at no cost and, if so, such medical care will not
constitute part of recovery.
402. Lost wages, loss of earning capacity, etc.
403. Clinical proof of pain would activate a recovery schedule, with the amount of
recovery based on the duration of disability and not on the intensity.
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Whatever the initial mechanism, subsequent premiums
would be adjusted on the basis of the injury experience in the
particular medical field and on the basis of individualized claim
experience. Physicians in high-risk specialties in high-risk
states would pay the highest premiums, and individual physi-
cians with high-claim experience would pay higher premiums.
Similarly, third-party payers' premiums could be based on both
the risk they undertake and their actual claims history. The
fund can act as a deterrent to unsafe practice if premiums are
based on actual claims history-both the number of claims and
total amount paid out for the claims.
4. Duty of Public Notice
The authorizing statute of the fund would create a duty on
the provider, institution, or organization to notify all patients of
the fund's availability, benefits, and limitations. In addition, it
would require publication of risk experience. These require-
ments would assure that patients were aware of their rights
and could exercise those rights before the running of the statute
of limitations. It would also provide patients with information
that they could use to evaluate providers or procedures.40 4
5. Exemptions
Intentional and malicious conduct would be exempted from
the fund, and the patient would continue to have a tort cause of
action, but without the defendant having any of the usual con-
duct defenses. Refusal or failure of the physician to participate
in the fund would give the patient the option of recovery against
the defendant (at three times the normal recovery) or recovery
in tort without the defendant having conduct defenses.
6. Attorney's Fees
If the patient brings in an attorney because of a denial of a
claim, a prevailing patient's costs of suit or administrative
costs, excluding attorney's fees, would be payable by the defend-
ant. The patient and the attorney could make any appropriate
agreement concerning attorney's fees, but the department of
medical injury compensation would have the authority to
approve or disapprove any attorney's fee agreement. If the
404. Starr, supra note 375, at 825.
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department disapproves, the attorney's services would be com-
pensable under a statutorily set rate.
C. Problems of a Medical Injury Compensation Fund
Implementing a medical injury compensation scheme
presents several difficulties. The first problem is the ability to
maintain fiscal stability in the face of increasing participation.
The second problem is curing and preventing the occurrence of
fraud, abuse, and malingering. The third problem is state and
federal constitutional challenges. Finally, because a scheme
such as this would have to be enacted legislatively, the fourth
problem is political feasibility.
1. Fiscal Stability
Any compensation scheme that proposes to include one
hundred percent of medical injuries will face issues related to
fiscal stability. Workers' compensation schemes continuously
confront issues of continued fiscal viability.4° In general, the
rising cost of medical care for the injured worker has placed
workers' compensation systems in jeopardy. 40 The state can
absolutely control by statute the amount of benefits received by
the injured worker herself, but cannot control medical costs.
However, the definitions of temporary total disability, tempo-
rary partial disability, permanent total disability, and perma-
nent partial disability have been altered by the courts over the
years that workers' compensation systems have been in place,
so that the length of recovery time allowed for any particular
injury has expanded over time.4 °7
This problem precurses a decision that must be made in
connection with a medical injury compensation scheme:
whether to compensate on the basis of simple physical impair-
ment, such as loss of bodily function, or the more complex loss of
earning capacity. The issue of increasing costs of medical serv-
ices should not be as significant in the case of a medical injury
compensation fund because the additional compensation for
medical injuries would be a quid pro quo to offset medical cost
containment efforts, such as utilization review and financial
risk shifting. These cost containment efforts should prevent the
405. Id. at 829 n.184.
406. H. Michael Bagley et al., Workers' Compensation, 44 MERCER L. REV. 457
(1992).
407. See generally 2 LARSON, supra note 393, § 10-57.
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fiscal instability arising from runaway medical costs that have
plagued workers' compensation systems.
2. Fraud, Abuse, and Malingering
In any system where compensation is made not on the basis
of conduct but on the basis of status, the problems of fraud,
abuse, and malingering are intensified.4 °8 Ordinarily, a person
who seeks medical treatment seeks the care for physical,
mental (psychological), or social reasons. A compensation
scheme adds an economic incentive. Physicians are trained to
distinguish between physical, mental, and social causes for ill-
ness or articulated symptoms but are not necessarily adept at
identifying economic causes. Thus, curing fraud, abuse, and
malingering will be a problem with a medical injury compensa-
tion scheme just as it has been a problem with workers' compen-
sation. Still, the benefit of providing compensation to the
significant number of injured individuals who have been previ-
ously excluded outweighs any additional costs of overcoming
fraud, abuse, and malingering.40 9
3. Constitutionality
In workers' compensation, a takings issue arises because
the employer forgoes its defenses and the employee gives up a
right to full recovery, both of which are arguably property
rights. In New York Central Railroad v. White,410 however, the
Supreme Court held that the government has a right to add to,
and subtract from, defenses as a right of sovereignty.4 1' The
Court also held that because the workers' compensation system
incorporated a quid pro quo (foregoing defenses in exchange for
foregoing complete recovery), the scheme did not constitute a
taking.412 A medical injury compensation scheme incorporates
the same quid pro quo. Health care providers give up their
408. For example, estimates by the General Accounting Office put the amount of
welfare fraud and abuse at $1 billion per year. Fraud in Welfare Put at $1 Billion, N.Y.
TueEs, Dec. 7, 1987, at A25.
409. One study estimates that one percent of hospital patients receive an injury
caused by physician negligence. Of those that are injured, only 2 out of every 15 file a
claim. Of those who file a claim, only 50% are ever compensated. So only 1 in 15
injured patients ever receive compensation. Paul C. Weiler et al., Proposal for Medical
Liability Reform, 267 JAMA 2355, 2355 (1992) (reporting the results of a medical
practice study performed at Harvard).
410. 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
411. Id. at 200.
412. Id. at 201.
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defenses, and patients give up their right to full recovery. Over
the last ten years, however, the Supreme Court has dramati-
cally altered its view of what constitutes a taking, so that its
attitude about workers' compensation schemes may no longer
hold.4 1s
4. Political Feasibility
Only a few years ago, the political feasibility of instituting a
medical injuries compensation scheme would have been ques-
tionable. There was little public concern about the so-called
medical malpractice crisis and powerful opposition to such a
scheme.414 Both attorneys and insurers had powerful lobbies
that could effectively oppose any state or federal attempts to
institute a medical injuries no-fault scheme.4 15 The recent
focus on the need to reform the health care system to control
cost may make a medical injury compensation scheme more
appealing.416 In effect, the quid pro quo for instituting utiliza-
tion review, financial risk shifting, and other cost containment
measures should be the compensation of all medical injuries.
D. Benefits and Consequences of a Medical Injury
Compensation Fund
A medical injury compensation fund would have several
benefits. One benefit would be an overall reduction in adminis-
trative costs for medical injuries. Another benefit would be sig-
nificantly increased participation in this recovery system over
the tort system. As participation increased, however, potential
monetary recovery would be reduced. The most significant ben-
efit would be spreading the cost of managed care injuries to
managed care products. The fund would avoid the problems
that traditional tort theories present and would also avoid the
barrier that ERISA presents.
1. Reduced Administrative Costs
Administrative costs would be reduced. The time and delay
of traditional jury trials are not present in the typical workers'
413. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Comm'n, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
414. Starr, supra note 375, at 835.
415. Id. at 835-36.
416. In the last year over 3,000 articles have been written on health care cost
containment. In the 102nd Congress, over twenty bills were introduced that addressed
the issue of health care reform and cost containment.
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compensation scheme and would not be present in the medical
injury compensation fund.4 17 Instead, authorizing legislation
would impose strict liability on health care providers and orga-
nizations. 418  Thus, society's interest in preventing economic
hardship and reducing transactional costs would be elevated
over the attribution of fault. This elevation would allow for
faster claim administration. 419
2. Increased Participation
Currently, of every one hundred patients who experience a
medical injury, approximately six receive compensation.420
Under a medical injuries compensation fund, all one hundred
would receive compensation. Although patients who cannot
prove an injury or prove that an injury occurred in the course of
medical care would still not recover, they by definition do not
have a medical injury.
3. Reduced Monetary Recovery
Reduced monetary recovery by the patient is necessary to
limit the economic liability of the health care providers and of
society as a whole.421 The limits on societal resources require
that some of the risks of medical treatment be apportioned to
the patient.
Of every one hundred patients who suffer an injury during
and related to medical treatment, seventeen have injuries fall-
ing within the present concepts of provider negligence. 422 Of
these, only four receive any compensation. 423 Thus, a scheme
compensating all one hundred injured patients could cost about
twenty-five times as much as the present system; a scheme
compensating only the seventeen injuries because of provider
fault would cost about four times as much. Even assuming a
dramatic increase in system efficiency, resulting in only thirty
percent of the premium dollars being lost in transactional costs,
the scheme would still cost three to seventeen times as much as
417. Starr, supra note 375, at 817.
418. Id.
419. Id.
420. Weiler et al., supra note 409, at 2355.
421. Starr, supra note 375, at 810.
422. Id. at 806 (citing CALIFORNIA MEDICAL ABS'N AND CALIFORNIA HosP. ASS'N,
REPORT ON THE MEDICAL INsuRANcE FEAsIBILITy STUny 65 (D. Mills ed., 1977)).
423. Id.
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presently. 424 Consequently, as noted by one author, "economic
realities require patients to carry some of the risk of injury."425
4. Greater Spread of the Cost of Managed Care Injuries
Current tort theories are inadequate to encompass man-
aged care injuries. The doctrines of corporate negligence,
respondeat superior, and ostensible agency are all inadequate to
spread the cost of managed care injuries because they focus on
the negligent conduct of providers and not on the utilization
review process or financial risk shifting. Attempts to hold the
managed care product directly liable for utilization review and
financial risk shifting have not been able to overcome the ten-
dency of courts to focus on the character of the decision-making
conduct rather than on the inevitability of effects on individual
patients. Thus, when trying to hold managed care directly lia-
ble, the problems of burden of proof continue to prevent liability
from attaching. These problems are overcome with a medical
injury compensation fund, because all medical injuries, regard-
less of the source, would be covered.
E. Summary
The goals of the current tort system to compensate victims
and to deter substandard medical care cannot be met for either
existing medical injuries or managed care injuries. In contrast,
a medical injury compensation system, like workers' compensa-
tion, could compensate quickly, correctly, and without regard to
fault. Such a system would not only have the advantage of
increasing compensation from four percent to one hundred per-
cent for medical injuries, it would also be an efficient way of
covering medical injuries caused by health care cost contain-
ment efforts, thus spreading the risk of cost containment
throughout society.
VII. CONCLUSION
The health care system is undergoing drastic changes. One
major change is in the relationships among physicians,
patients, and third-party payers. Third-party payers are find-
ing an increasing amount of their profit going to health care
costs. As health care costs increase, third-party payers are
424. Id. at 810 n.43.
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seeking ways to introduce cost containment into the equation.
One way that managed care organizations effect cost contain-
ment is by shifting the risk of overutilization to the physician,
thus inducing the physician to order fewer medical services and
to refuse to treat high-risk patients.
The Hippocratic oath requires that the physician do no
harm.4 2 6 Patients expect physicians to act in the patients' best
interest.427 Third-party payers (particularly managed care
products) now contract with physicians to act as gatekeepers to
health care services, to avoid providing services that are mini-
mally beneficial, and to protect the wealth of the third-party
payers.
This new relationship between third-party payers and phy-
sicians introduces a new and different risk into the health care
delivery system: A patient may be injured because a physician
failed to provide services because of the financial pressures of
third-party payers. Under this arrangement, third-party pay-
ers, as the new rule makers, are in the best position to promote
safety and prevent injury. Thus, it is important that as the
health care system changes, new systems of compensation or
means of risk placement be developed based on the new rela-
tionships between physician, patient, and third-party payer.
Traditionally, third-party payers have not been held liable
for the actions of health care providers. That standard was
developed because no contractual relationship existed between
the third-party payers and the health care providers. Now,
third-party payers have contractual relationships with health
care providers that require the physician to act as an agent for
the third-party payer. These new contractual relationships
obligate providers to provide care within the guidelines of the
managed care products. Thus, third-party payers, not provid-
ers, set the standard of care. Yet, when patients are injured
because of the standard of care, the third-party payers are insu-
lated from liability. Thus, third-party payers unfairly avoid
paying for injuries that their managed care activities cause, and
patients are left with uncompensated injuries.
The legal system must apportion liability based on the risk
that an actor has created. Managed care actors have introduced
426. Curley Bonds, The Hippocratic Oath: A Basis for Modern Ethical Standards,
264 JAMA 2311 (1990); see also Donald Konold, Codes of Medical Ethics: History, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BioETmcs 162 (Warren T. Reich ed., 1978).
427. See supra notes 168-171 and accompanying text.
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risks that individuals will be injured as providers are pressured
to deny access to beneficial services. If cost containment is
important to society, the injuries that result from lower health
care costs should be spread throughout society. The injured
patient should not be required to bear the cost alone, nor should
the provider. The appropriate party to assume the risk is the
entity that created the risk-the third-party payer. Thus, a
medical injury compensation fund is a fair quid pro quo for cost
containment measures that run the risk of increasing uncom-
pensated medical injuries. It assures compensation for those
injured, while spreading the cost to those generating the risk.
Thus, a medical injury compensation fund can solve the prob-
lem of managed care cost containment injuries.
